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Abstract
The combination of location-awareness and social networks has introduced
systems containing an increased amount of protection-worthy personal infor-
mation, creating the need for improved privacy control from a user point of
view.
End-user privacy requirements were derived from identified end-user pri-
vacy preferences. These requirements were used to evaluate current Location-
Aware Social Network Services’ (LASNSs’) end-user privacy control as well
as help develop relevant enhancements.
These requirements allows users to be able to control (if they wish) which
of the objects related to them are accessed by whom, in what way and under
which conditions. Two enhancement ideas which together helps fulfill this
requirement have been presented. The few LASNSs offering the user access
control rule specification only provides a small list of pre-defined subjects
(e.g ”Friends”, ”Everyone”). This list is too limited for specification of many
fine-grained privacy preferences. With a more extensive implementation of
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) in LASNSs, with the user as the system
administrator of roles, users will be able to create roles (e.g. ”colleague”,
”close friend”, ”family”), assign them to their connections, and specify these
roles as subjects in access control rules. The user will also be allowed to spec-
ify conditions, under which subject(s)/role(s) can access an object. These
conditions can be based on system attributes of the object owner (e.g lo-
cation), the subject requesting access (e.g age) or external attributes (e.g
time). A suitable user-friendly access control user interface has been pro-
posed, showing how this can be presented in an effective and understandable
way to the user. A few example user privacy preferences, each one repre-
senting one of the identified end-user privacy control requirements have been
translated from data sent to the system through the proposed interface, into
formal languages like Datalog and XACML.
Current end-user privacy control can be improved, by making more fine-
grained access control rule specification possible, through the proposed en-
hancements, suitable both from an end-user perspective and from a devel-
oper’s point of view.
Keywords: Location-Aware Social Network Services, Privacy preferences,
Enhanced end-user privacy, Access control rules, Role Based Access Control,
Use of XACML, Use of Datalog.
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Glossary
This glossary provides an explanation of how to interpret the technical terms
used in this master thesis. A star (*) is specified for explanations created or
modified (from standard or generally accepted definitions) by the author.
Access control rule* - A rule which may be used to grant or deny a user
or set of users access rights to an object or an operation (and possibly
specify how and when).
App - A piece of software. It can run on the Internet, on a computer, or on
a phone or other electronic device.
Owner - The subject of personally-identifiable information.
Privacy Control* - Users’ control over their own privacy, in this case
through access control.
Privacy Control Panel* - The interface where users try to match the pri-
vacy settings for their account with their own privacy preferences.
Privacy Policy - A set of privacy rules.
Privacy Preference* - A user-preferred level of privacy in a certain setting.
Example: ”I would like only my friends to see my profile images”.
Subject - An entity requesting access to an object.
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Services
This master thesis will mention and discuss many different Social Network
Services (SNSs), Location-Aware SNSs (LASNSs) and other types of services.
The following is a list of all the mentioned services, uniquely identifying them
through name and relevant sites where they can currently be found. There
will be times when the text will refer to a service or a part of service, e.g the
privacy control panel for accounts, which is not accessible unless one is logged
into such a service with a valid user. This list will thus serve as references
for these services, such that one can access (possibly through creating an
account) the discussed material. Where it is necessary screenshots of the
material will be included.
Android - A software stack for mobile devices, includes an OS, middleware
and applications. Home page: http://source.android.com/.
Android Market - Android’s app marketplace. Home page: https://
market.android.com/. For more information about Android see the
Android service.
Booyah - A social web and entertainment company. Home page: http:
//www.booyah.com/.
Brightkite - A LASNS for exploring locations and connecting with people.
Home page: http://brightkite.com/. (Access to the privacy control
settings discussed in this master thesis requires log in with a valid
account)
Buddy - A mobile service for locating friends. Home page: http://www.
mbuddy.no/.
Classmates.com - A SNS for re-connecting with (past) classmates. Home
page: http://www.classmates.com/?
Digg - A SNS for discovering and sharing web content. Home page: http:
//digg.com/. Further information about the service can be found at
http://about.digg.com/.
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Facebook - A SNS for connecting with people and sharing content. Home
page: http://www.facebook.com/ (Access to the privacy control set-
tings discussed in this master thesis requires log in with a valid ac-
count).
Facebook Developers - Site for help using the Facebook API. Home page:
http://developers.facebook.com/.
Facebook Places - A LASNS addition to Facebook. Home page: http:
//www.facebook.com/places/ (Access to the privacy control settings
discussed in this master thesis requires log in with a valid account).
Foursquare - A LASNS for exploring locations and connecting with people.
Home page: https://foursquare.com/ (Access to the privacy control
settings discussed in this master thesis requires log in with a valid
account).
Gowalla - A LASNS for sharing and exploring locations plus connecting
with friends. Home page: http://gowalla.com/ (Access to the pri-
vacy control settings discussed in this master thesis requires log in with
a valid account).
Linkedin - A SNS for professional profiles and connections. Home page:
http://www.linkedin.com/
Loopt - A LASNS for exploring locations and connecting with people. Home
page: https://www.loopt.com/ (Access to the privacy control settings
discussed in this master thesis requires log in with a valid account).
Socialcast - A SNS for enterprise collaboration. Home page: http://www.
socialcast.com/
Yelp - A social networking site offering help through user reviews and a
local search web site. Home page: http://www.yelp.com/
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Online social networks have the last two decades become more and more
popular, and have been developed in different directions providing different
service-types. The recent development, facilitated by smartphones and other
new phones capable of calculating the phone’s current position, is social net-
work services paired with location-aware features. We call each such service
a Location-Aware Social Network Service (LASNS). New phones often con-
tain, or are capable of downloading and installing, software connecting them
with these services. People usually carry their location-aware phones with
them at all times, and are now able to share their current location with their
social network connections through the click of a few buttons. Social network
services and now LASNSs, are often used for social interaction and fun, and
development is driven by a search for new and fun ways of using existing
data with new technology. People share more and more of their personal
information through these services, yet focus on user privacy control has not
followed the same pace. For many of these new services the user has little
control of how the content they produce is handled and shared with other
users. It appears to us like user privacy is not the priority of the LASNS
developers as the user control panels usually are limited to coarse-grained
control settings. While new fun and interactive features are released, privacy
control often remain, in our opinion, inadequate.
1.1 Motivation
As a user of a Social Network Service (SNS), we value the ability to control
how the information we create, or that in some way is related to us, is shared
and treated. A large portion of this kind of data is personal and not the
type of data everyone would like to share with all people in all situations.
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Some SNS privacy control panels partially fulfill these requirements, yet we
have not come across one SNS privacy panel where there is no room for
improvement. It is important to realize that different users have different
privacy preferences. Some users might find current control panels completely
adequate for reflecting their preferences, and others might not even care
about privacy. Still, the goal should be to be able to reflect every user’s
privacy preferences, including the ones who find that privacy control panels
for these services currently provides too coarse-grained control for their taste.
The addition of locational information in SNS systems pose new require-
ments for user privacy control. A person’s location might not only tell you
where that person is at the time, it can also indicate other personal infor-
mation when paired with additional data like what time it is, possibly who
else is there at that time and/or other surrounding factors. In this thesis
we hope to illustrate why it is important to control locational information as
well as other data in these LASNSs, shed light on the shortcomings of current
user privacy control for SNS and LASNS available today, and at last suggest
enhancements to improve such user privacy control. Our goal is to present
suggestions which will enhance the privacy control panels such that they are
able to reflect nearly all users’ possible privacy preferences, providing the
users with the tools to protect their locations and other personal data from
undesired disclosure.
1.2 Objectives
Based on our observations and motivational factors, research questions arise.
The objectives we wish to reach and the research questions we wish to answer
in this thesis are:
1. What kind of access control features exist in current LASNS to control
end-user’s privacy?
2. What kind of privacy preferences may end-users have in LASNSs?
3. Are existent access control features in LASNSs able to satisfy end-user’s
privacy requirements/preferences?
4. Which privacy-enhancing access control features in LASNSs should
be added (or improved in which way) to satisfy end-user’s require-
ments/preferences? (Illustrated with examples.)
5. How can the privacy-enhancing access control features be represented
to end-users?
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6. How can the privacy-enhancing access control features be represented
in terms of logic rules and in machine readable format (e.g. XACML)?
1.3 Scope
The main focus of this thesis and its proposed results will be limited to
LASNSs. LASNSs will be our focus when we discuss current user privacy
as well as suggesting relevant enhancements. Yet, this thesis contains one
chapter discussing privacy in SNSs, namely Chapter 4. This is because SNSs
are a part of LASNSs, and it is thus useful to discuss and understand the
social network aspect of LASNSs. Even though the proposed access control
enhancements are meant for LASNS, it does not necessarily mean they can
not be applied to SNS privacy control.
The result chapter, called ”Enhanced Privacy Control Framework for
LASNSs”, will present the suggestions of how to improve user privacy con-
trol through enhanced access control rule specification. This master thesis
will only suggest general ideas and recommendations based on discussion and
analysis, for how to enhance LASNSs. These will not be applied in practice
to any LASNS, due to time-limitations.
1.4 Methodology
To analyze existing user privacy control, and propose possible enhancements,
we have to define some sort of goal to measure against. This goal is for users
to be able to reflect their LASNS privacy preferences through their accounts’
privacy control settings. This requires us to reflect upon and understand
what kind of privacy preferences users can have. As explained by the project
UbiCompForAll (Ubiquitous service composition for all users ) in their collec-
tion of scenarios ([Ubi10]), the use of scenarios is a good method for coming
up with new system ideas, and to understand the system’s users. We have
therefore selected a scenario-driven approach. End-user privacy requirements
will be derived from identified end-user privacy preferences. These require-
ments will help us analyze current LASNSs’ end-user privacy control as well
as help develop and evaluate relevant enhancements. We will use fine-grained
access control as a mean towards developing these enhancements. In order
to show how the enhancements can be implemented, we use translation of
data from end-user privacy preferences through a proposed Graphical User
Interface (GUI) into a logic programming language Datalog and a declarative
functional language XACML representation.
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1.5 Outline
This thesis is outlined in the following way. After this introductory chapter,
a background chapter will be presented. The background chapter will pro-
vide the reader with sufficient knowledge of the techniques and technologies
discussed in this thesis. To be able to analyze and acquire an understanding
of the user’s privacy perspective, Chapter 3, called ”Scenarios” follows the
background chapter. This chapter consists of a list of many different user pri-
vacy preferences for different objects, subjects and access types. They take
place in either the context of 1) a regular Facebook user (Scenario 1), an
example of a SNS setting, or 2) a Facebook Places user (Scenario 2), an ex-
ample of a LASNS settings. Then follows a chapter discussing privacy in SNS
systems, Chapter 4. This chapter contains a general presentation of SNSs, a
concrete example of such services (Facebook), and based on the previous dis-
cussion of general and specific SNSs, our proposed privacy requirements for
SNSs in general. Following is a chapter called ”Privacy in Location-Aware
Social Networks” (Chapter 5), circling in on the main focus of this thesis,
location-awareness in SNSs. This chapter discusses underlying technologies,
integration with SNSs, a few example LASNSs and for each part, a discus-
sion of privacy in the context of the relevant part. This chapter also contains
a privacy analysis of current user privacy control in LASNSs. Chapter 6,
”Enhanced Privacy Control Framework for LASNSs” is the chapter where
we present our results; the proposed privacy enhancements, and discuss the
implementation of these enhancements. A discussion of future work in Chap-
ter 7 will then be presented, before Chapter 8 provides a conclusion of the
work with this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This master thesis work will be focused mainly on privacy control through
Access Control (AC) and privacy policies, and the interaction of services
offered within these two fields. It is therefore useful to spend some time
discussing these subjects in general. This chapter will present a necessary
overview of each subject in turn, not only discussing the basic concepts, but
also some newer models and developments.
2.1 Access control
The field of AC is one which has been created alongside the development of
many kinds of computer systems. These systems have had different security
and access control needs, which in turn has created the demand for different
access control schemes.
[oD85] was one of the first papers to officially formalize AC, and was
issued by the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) in 1983. This document,
named the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, mainly introduced
the two AC schemes Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary
Access Control (DAC). These two schemes were developed to fulfill the
DoDs requirements for access control in military computer systems. The
MAC scheme is the one that has the closest relations to the military domain,
and one example of this relation is the basis for MAC decisions (as stated in
[oD85] ):
”...subjects and objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that
are a combination of hierarchical classification levels and non-
hierarchical categories, and the labels shall be used as the basis
for mandatory access control decisions”
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The hierarchical classification levels are directly translatable to the DoD
clearance hierarchy, ”unclassified” ”confidential”, ”secret” and ”top secret”,
while the non-hierarchical categories can be translated into the different mil-
itary departments and work fields. This is one of the reasons why these AC
schemes work well within the military domain, but might not be as efficient
in other domains, like SNS systems, and why other AC schemes have been
developed. Such schemes will be presented below, after a brief introduction
to the basic concepts of AC and a more thorough presentation of MAC and
DAC.
2.1.1 Basic concepts
Access control is the task of limiting and controlling what resources an au-
thenticated user is allowed to access, and in what way. AC will obviously not
be effective unless secure authentication of a user was performed in advance.
After the authentication process is complete, a user might start requesting
access to different resources. When AC is present in the system, the user
will make the request through an Access Control Point (ACP), which will
decide whether or not to grant the request. The ACP will base its decisions
on previously defined rules, which can include current conditions and other
factors decided by the system developers and administrators.
Most AC systems makes their control decisions based on rules of some
sort. These rules can have different types of authors, and can even be induced
by more general rules or the owner of the resource in question. For basic AC
systems, a rule will consist of three entities. The subject (S) , the object
(O) and the type of access to be granted (T). An example of such a rule can
be: S has the permission to perform T on O. The subject S can be a user
or an application running on behalf of a user, and is the entity requesting
permission. The object O is the resource in which the subject requests access
to, and could take the shape of a system resource, a file or anything else one
might wish to restrict access to. T is the type of access the subject wishes
to perform on the object. When O is a file, T might be operations such as
read, write, execute, append, etc.
One important extension to the basic AC access rule format worth men-
tioning is the concept of conditions. Each access rule will then not only
consist of S,O and T, but also conditions C. With this extension the rules
will have the following shape: S has the permission to perform T on O, given
C. Many types of conditions exist, but the two which are the most interest-
ing for this master thesis are the temporal and the geographical. A temporal
condition describes at which points in time S can access O. A geographi-
cal condition will rely on the location of the subject or object, and describe
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows how access control is performed in general.
Entities will request access to certain objects, and the guard/monitor will
make decisions on whether to grant access or not, based on policies (and in
some cases log the request).
at which locations S is granted access to O. Both these, plus Conditional
Privacy-aware RBAC will be further explored below as RBAC extensions.
2.1.2 Discretionary Access Control
DAC was officially presented in [oD85], and in it defined as:
”A means of restricting access to objects based on the identity
of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access
permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indi-
rectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by mandatory
access control).”
DAC was developed as a way to control different kinds of access to objects
by subjects. In a purely discretionary access control system there are no
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Figure 2.2: This figure shows how Discretionary Access Control is performed.
It is similar to the general AC model in Figure 2.1, only here the guard/-
monitor will make the access control decisions based on an access matrix.
mandatory access control policies, meaning that access control policies are
defined by subjects. A subject can even hold certain access rights giving it
permission to grant other subjects the same access rights.
2.1.3 Mandatory Access Control
As mentioned previously, MAC was developed by the DoD, and is custom-
made to manage classified information flow within the military. The goal
is to protect confidentiality by keeping classified information from leaking
down the classification hierarchy. [oD85] defines how MAC achieves this goal
through this precise description:
”A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity
(as represented by a label) of the information contained in the
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objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects
to access information of such sensitivity”.
MAC is therefore based on policies and the control by a security policy
administrator and will not, as opposed to DAC, allow users to override these
policies to control access to different objects. This means that an owner of
e.g. a file, will not be able to grant access to that file to a user which based
on the policies would otherwise be denied access.
Figure 2.3: This figure shows how Mandatory Access Control can be mod-
eled. Users and objects are divided into different classification levels. The
guards/monitors will make access control decision based on the levels of the
subject and object, plus global rules.
The Bell and LaPadula model
One of the first MAC models was the Bell and LaPadula model ([BP76]), and
it is therefore presented as an example of a MAC model. It was developed to
control the confidentiality of objects with a certain sensitivity/classification
level for the operating system Multix ([BP76]), often used within the military.
In other words: Preventing information-leakage to subjects or objects with
lower classification than what was defined for that information.
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According to this model every subject and object are assigned an access
class, which consists of a security level plus a set of categories. To exemplify
the model we will use security levels and categories found in the military
domain. The assigned security level has to be an element of a totally or-
dered set, and will for this example consist of the following elements with
relationships accordingly; Top Secret (TS) > Secret (S) > Confidential (C)
> Unclassified (U). The categories Nuclear, Navy and Army will serve as the
relevant categories for this explanation. A subject or object can be assigned
multiple categories, for instance both Nuclear and Navy.
Access classes, containing both security level and categories, are a par-
tially ordered set with the following formal dominance relationship ≥:
Definition : Dominance relationship One access class AC1 = (Level1,
Categories1) dominates another access class AC2 = (Level2, Categories2),
AC1 ≥ AC2, if both of the following conditions hold: i) Level1 ≥ Level2 (the
security level of AC1 is greater or equal than the security level of AC2) and ii)
Categories1 ⊇ Categories2 (the category set of AC1 includes the category
set of AC2).
If Level1 > Level1 and Categories1 ⊃ Categories2 then AC1 > AC2,
AC1 strictly dominates AC2. AC1 and AC2 are incomparable if neither
AC1 ≥ AC2 nor AC1 ≤ AC2 (neither dominates the other).
This model is based on the concept of a state machine. An initial ”secure
state” is defined, and each transition in accordance with the rules will result
in another secure state. The state of the system is denoted (A, L). A is the
set of current accesses under execution in the form of (s, o, p), subject s is
exercising privilege p on o. L is the level function for each subject and object:
L : O ∪ S → AC. O and S represents all objects and subjects, respectively,
while AC is the set of access classes in the system.
For this model there are two MAC state rules and one DAC state rule
(based on an access matrix) with three security properties. When making a
decision of whether to grant an access request for access (s, o, p), the resulting
new state is examined based on the following three properties. Only if the
new state satisfies all the properties, the transition is made, and the system
is still secure by definition.
The simple security property - This property is designed to prevent sub-
jects from reading objects with access classes dominating or that are
incomparable to their own, also known as the ”no-read-up property”.
A new state (A, L) satisfies the simple security property if, for each
element (s, o, p) ∈ A, where p=read or p=write, the following holds:
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L(s) ≥ L(o) (where L(s) and L(o) are the level functions of the subject
and object in question).
The * property - This property was designed to prevent write operations
on lower or incomparable objects, preventing unauthorized information-
leakage downwards. It is also known as the ”no-write-down property”.
A state satisfies this property only if for each element (s, o, p) ∈ A,
where p=append or p=write, the following holds: L(s) ≤ L(o).
The discretionary security property - This property ensures some level
of DAC, stating that a state is secure if the access requested (s, o, p)
is allowed by the system’s access matrix.
2.1.4 Role Based Access Control
Figure 2.4: This figure illustrates how Role Based Access Control can be
modeled. Compared to Figure 2.2 showing DAC, RBAC is somewhat similar.
The main difference is how all users are assigned to roles. Roles are assigned
to permissions (the same way as DAC does for users), where a permission
defines which operations are accessible to which role on each relevant object.
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Today’s computer systems and programs pose different and new chal-
lenges regarding access control. Operating systems and applications for
smartphones, laptop computers, servers, mainframes, and different types of
applications such as embedded systems, desktop applications, web applica-
tions, web services and console applications will require different AC models.
The ”old” AC models using only DAC, MAC or a combination of the two, no
longer fulfills all types of access control requirements. Many of these systems
are fairly complex, with numerous subjects and objects, and when using DAC
or MAC, there will be a vast amount of overhead when it comes to managing
and administrating access control. Access control in systems with a high
churn rate of subjects or objects are especially difficult and time-consuming
to manage. RBAC is a model developed to ease the job of assigning to and
revoking from subjects access authorizations to protected objects.
The basic concept is this, as seen in Figure 2.4: Do not assign access
rights to subjects, but assign it to roles, and in turn, assign subjects to these
roles. This extra step in the link between subjects and access rights, will
ease administration of access permission assignments as there are usually
less roles than subjects. In a scenario where all managers in a company are
to be granted access to certain reports in a system without RBAC, there
has to be a change in permissions for each subject representing a manager.
If the system implements RBAC, and the managers are assigned to the role
”Manager”, only one permission has to be changed, that of the role Manager’s
access to the reports.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) has published a stan-
dard for RBAC in the document American National Standard 359-2004
([fITS04]). The standard defines different functional components of an RBAC
implementation. Included are the following components: Core RBAC, Hi-
erarchical RBAC and Constrained RBAC. The latter includes the two con-
cepts Static Separation of Duties (SSoD) and Dynamic separation of Duties
(DSoD). The standard acknowledges that different systems have different
requirements, and that not all components are appropriate in every system.
That is the reason why Core RBAC is required, while the other components
are optional.
Core RBAC
Core RBAC is the basic component of the RBAC standard, and consists of a
defined set of elements and with defined relationships between these. There
are six elements that make up the building blocks for Core RBAC. These
elements and the most important relationships between them are depicted in
Figure 2.5 and explained below:
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Figure 2.5: This figure illustrates how the different entities defined in the Core
RBAC standard relates to each other. The figure is taken from [fITS04]
USERS - The set of users accessing the system.
ROLES - The set of roles that USERS can be assigned to.
OBS - The set of objects that can be accessed by USERS.
OPS - The set of operations that can be performed on OBS.
PRMS - The set of permissions allowing OPS to be performed on OBS,
more precisely a set of pairs: (object ∈ OBS , operation ∈ OPS).
SESSIONS The set of PRMS available to a USER during a SESSION (Ses-
sions have been introduced to model sessions where a user logs in to a
system, and thereby activating a subset of roles assigned to that user).
The standard also defines the relationship between these. The important
ones are (as described in Figure 5.1 in [Fer10]):
UA ⊂ USERS x ROLES - Specifies the ROLES that USERS are allowed
to play.
PA ⊂ PRMS x ROLES - Assigns ROLES the permissions necessary to
perform the tasks of that ROLE.
Assigned prms: ROLES → 2PMRS - Maps ROLES into a set of PRMS.
Assigned users: ROLES → 2USERS - Maps a ROLE into a set of USERS.
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Session users: SESSIONS → USERS - Maps SESSIONS into the cor-
responding USERS.
Session roles: SESSIONS → 2ROLES - Maps a SESSION into a set of
ROLES.
Avl sess prms: SESSIONS → 2PMRS - Describes the PRMS available to
a user during a SESSION.
Hierarchical RBAC
Hierarchical RBAC is an optional component and describes a hierarchy of
roles, introducing a partial order relation on ROLES. This relation is depicted
as the Role Hierarchy (RH) in Figure 2.6. This role-hierarchy often aims to
reflect the lines of authority and responsibility within the organization using
this system. Every role inherits the permissions of all its descendants, re-
flecting the relationship between superiors and subordinates within an orga-
nization. The Role Hierarchy (RH ⊆ ROLES x ROLES) is defined as ≥, and
identifies pairs of roles (ri, rj) where ri inherits the permissions of rj. Given
two roles ri, rj ∈ ROLES, ri ≥ rj implies the following: i) Assigned prms(ri)
⊆ Assigned prms(rj) and ii) Assigned users(ri) ⊆ Assigned users(rj).
Figure 2.6: This figure shows how Hierarchical RBAC adds to Core RBAC,
showing the added relation called ”Role Hierarchy”, which illustrates that
roles are related to each other, forming a hierarchy. The figure is taken from
[fITS04]
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Constrained RBAC
As discussed in the presentation of basic AC in Section 2.1.1, constraints have
been added to the basic AC model, defining conditions under which the per-
missions are to be granted. Constraints have also been added to the standard
as an RBAC component, but it supports only one type of constraint. The
standard only supports a Separation of Duties (SoD) constraint, which in
effect is constraining the assignment of ROLES to USERS both directly and
indirectly, through the assignment of SESSIONS to ROLES (while USERS
are assigned to SESSIONS). Rules restricting which roles can be simultane-
ously assigned to a user can sometimes be necessary.
One example include the two roles of ”internal financial auditor” and ”fi-
nancial bookkeeper” within the same company. There should be a company
policy stating that an employee is not allowed to audit his or her own work,
meaning that no employee can be assigned one of the roles while assigned
to the other. If not, an auditor can audit his/her own bookkeeping-work,
increasing the chance of undiscovered fraud. This policy should be enforced
by the AC system, and the enforcement is ensured by implementing SoD
constraints with RBAC. Another example includes the two roles ”Doctor”
and ”Patient”, where a person can be both a Doctor and a Patient during
a certain time period, just not during the same session (doctors should not
examine themselves or write their own prescriptions). This constraint should
therefore be tied to SESSIONS. The two examples have created different re-
quirements, therefore two kinds of SoD constraint classes are supported by
the standard, Static SoD and Dynamic SoD respectively.
Static Separation of Duties SSoD constraints are statically enforced
whenever a user is assigned to a role, depicted in Figure 2.7, and define a
mutual exclusion among different roles a user can play. An SSoD constraint
is formally a pair (RS, n), where RS ⊆ ROLES and n a natural number where
n > 1. (RS, n) means that a user can play no more than n - 1 roles among
those in the set RS. If SSoD is implemented together with Hierarchical RBAC
the SSoD constraints will propagate along the hierarchy. This means that
when evaluating whether a user can safely be assigned a role according to the
constraints, both directly assigned roles and inherited roles are considered.
Dynamic Separation of Duties DSoD constraints differ from SSoD in
that they are dynamically enforced when a user activates different roles
through a session, as depicted in Figure 2.8. DSoD will at runtime pre-
vent a user from activating conflicting roles within the same session. DSoD
is also represented by pairs (RS, n), where RS ⊆ ROLES and n > 1, but
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Figure 2.7: This figure shows the addition of Static Separation of Duty
(SSoD) constraints on an RBAC implementation with both Core RBAC and
Hierarchical RBAC. The SSoD component will control which User Assign-
ments (UA) and Role Hierarchy (RH) assignments are made. The figure is
taken from [fITS04]
(RS, n) will in this case mean that a user may not activate n or more roles
from RS within the same session.
Figure 2.8: This figure shows a Core RBAC implementation with the addition
of Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSoD) constraint. The DSoD component
will constrain which combinations of roles are allowed to be activated during
a session. The figure is taken from [fITS04]
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2.1.5 Extensions of RBAC
Figure 2.9: This figure is similar to Figure 2.4, with the exception of two
types of constraints. User assignment (UA) constraints will control the as-
signment of users to roles. Role Activation (RA) constraints will control
which combination of roles will be activated during a session.
To be able to keep up with new access control requirements some new
extensions to the RBAC standard have been proposed. The direction mainly
taken by new extensions is that of using context information and different
kinds of constraints to make AC decisions. Figure 2.9 shows how context-
aware RBAC with constraints can work. For user-role assignment (UA) the
standard RBAC component SoD, plus trust/reputation constraints, can be
applied. However, it is through the role activation (RA) constraints the most
interesting new constraint extensions have been proposed. Temporal, Loca-
tional and Conditional constraints are the most interesting new concepts,
proposed through Temporal RBAC, Geo-RBAC and Conditional Privacy-
aware RBAC, and discussed below.
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Temporal RBAC
Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) described in [BBF01], provides the option to en-
able and disable different roles based on temporal conditions. These condi-
tions can be based on different times a day, weeks, months or any time-based
constraint. TRBAC basically supports periodic enabling and disabling of
roles, plus takes into consideration temporal dependencies between the en-
abling and disabling of these roles. As stated in [BBF01]:
”Such dependencies expressed by means of role triggers (active
rules that are automatically executed when the specified actions
occur) can also be used to constrain the set of roles that a par-
ticular user can activate at a given time instant.”
A trigger can be described as a list of preconditions for the activation of the
trigger. When a trigger is fired a role might be enabled or disabled at a
specific time, now or after a while. It is possible to assign priorities to such
enabling and disabling actions, and when conflict arises, the one with the
highest priority will be executed.
Geo-RBAC
Spatial-aware RBAC is described in [FV03] and [DBCP05]. Geo-RBAC is
a spatially aware RBAC, extending the RBAC standard with spatial roles.
It has been developed to enhance access control in location-aware services
and mobile applications, and is therefore highly relevant to this master
thesis. With Geo-RBAC access control decisions can be made based on
rules using spatial conditions, like object locations and user positions. The
spatial model adopted by Geo-RBAC is compliant with Open GeoSpatial
Consortium (OGC), which is a
”...non-profit, international, voluntary consensus standards orga-
nization that is leading the development of standards for geospa-
tial and location based services.”
as stated on their web site [Inc].
Geo-RBAC adds to RBAC the notion of a spatial role. A spatial role is
defined (in [DBCP05]) as a
”..geographically bounded organizational function”.
The boundaries for a spatial role is represented by a so-called ”feature”.
A feature is an instance of a feature type, which are types of geographical
places. Examples of feature types could be a city, a road address or a country.
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Examples of features could thus be ”London”, ”1600 Pennsylvania Avenue”
or ”Norway”, correspondingly. The physical location of a user will be directly
or indirectly fetched from a location-aware device, like a mobile phone, GPS,
etc. In addition to a physical location, a user will also be mapped to a logical
location, which will represent the feature where the user is located within.
The logical location (feature) will often be computed by mapping from the
physical location, and will be the boundary for the area the user has to be
within to play the relevant spatial role.
Conditional Privacy-aware RBAC
In [NB], the authors presents Conditional Privacy-aware RBAC (P-RBAC),
a model which incorporates an efficient way of expressing privacy policies
with RBAC. The Core P-RBAC includes seven entities: Users(U), Roles(R),
Data(D), Actions(A), Purposes(P), Obligations(O) and Conditions(C). These
are expressed through a customized language which they call LC0. A user
is a human being, a role is the same as for regular RBAC, data means any
information relating to an identifiable user and an action is some function
executed for the user. Purposes, conditions and obligations in Core P-RBAC
originates from the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data ([NB]).
Conditional P-RBAC, an addition to Core P-RBAC, allows more powerful
and complex condition specification, while still being able to evaluate whether
a condition in a permission assignment can be satisfied (a problem essentially
the same as the classic NP-complete satisfiability problem, SAT). According
to [NB] Conditional P-RBAC is characterized by the addition and definition
of:
• ”...a more expressive condition language LC1 and introduce the concept
of simple permission assignment set, for which SAT is tractable.”
• ”...a fully expressive condition language LC2 and introduce the concept
of advanced permission assignment set, for which SAT is theoretically
intractable but remains tractable in practice given a reasonable as-
sumption.”
In addition to Core P-RBAC and Conditional P-RBAC, they also present
the extension Universal P-RBAC, which is Conditional P-RBAC together
with the concept of hierarchies.
Through these additions to RBAC the authors are able to present a solu-
tion for expressing privacy policies together with RBAC, where more complex
conditions can be specified, containing algorithms for detecting conflicts, re-
dundancies, and indeterminism for a set of permission assignments.
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2.1.6 Logic in Access Control
Mart´ın Abadi in his paper called ”Logic in Access Control” ([Aba03]), sums
up the work done with logic in AC. It particularly discusses logically founded
languages for representing AC when programming or stating policies. The
work described in this paper is much more general than what we are going to
work with in this thesis, yet relevant as a way of combining system elements
into access control rules describing, in our case, user privacy policies. The
user may have many different privacy preferences and may be able to input
these to the system through a well-designed GUI, but in the end, the system
has to interpret them correctly, consult them when a subject requests a
certain permission to a certain object, and ultimately make the right access
control decision and enforce it. This thesis is limited to LASNSs, and our
main focus is user privacy. Because of the complexity of data in LASNSs, and
users’ myriad of possible preferences, we need a more complex representation
of access control rules than what a regular access control matrix, for instance,
can provide, only listing which accesses each subject has on each object. Since
we operate only in the context of LASNSs, this simplifies our requirements
for a complex logical language. Yet, this paper by Mart´ın Abadi provides
us with clues as to how we can represent users’ privacy preferences as access
control rules in a general format, in the context of a LASNS system. Logic
in access control is also discussed in Elisa Bertino, Barbara Catania, Elena
Ferrari and Paolo Perlasca’s article; ”A Logical Framework for Reasoning
about Access Control Models” ([BCFP03]). This article, however, proposes
a formal framework as a tool for reasoning about and discussing access control
models.
2.2 Privacy policies
Privacy policies can be found in different forms and contexts. A company
will typically have a privacy policy statement, stating how data of different
sensitivity levels and types are to be handled. A web site, like the University
of California, Santa Barbara web site: http://www.ucsb.edu/, states in
their Privacy Notification Statement, [UoC], how the system will handle the
information gathered while visitors navigate their web sites. Privacy policies
can be enforced by human protocols and/or routines, but also by computer
systems and programs. The latter is the most relevant, and there are different
ways of representing and enforcing privacy policies in a machine-readable way.
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2.2.1 Policies and privacy regulation
To be able to regulate and ensure any degree of privacy it is crucial to es-
tablish what privacy entails for the subject in question. The subject can
be a natural person or an organization. Some people wish to share more
than others, for instance the statement ”I do not wish to share pictures with
strangers” does not necessarily suit everyone in every situation. A photogra-
pher trying to create awareness of her work might not agree, while a private
person uploading images intended for view by only her friends will hopefully
demand this of her account settings. Organizations own and use information
with different sensitivity levels. The policy ”This information should not be
disclosed to anyone else besides company employees” will suit sensitive inter-
nal strategies, while it might be counter-productive for PR-material intended
for the public. That is why privacy needs to be defined before it is enforced,
and this can be done by creating privacy policies. A policy will usually be
relevant for a specific environment, a computer system, an organization or
similar. It will mostly consist of different rules governing how information
should be handled. Each rule is often concerned with protecting a resource,
which can be specified in general terms, like types of documents, everything
regarding personal information, all images, etc., or describe a specific entity
like a document containing the 2011 company budget. The rules will de-
scribe how different subjects are allowed to access the resource. An example
company policy might be; ”No one, except the people working in the Ad-
ministration and Human Relations departments, should have access to other
employees’ salaries.” An example of a person’s privacy preferences for a SNS,
stated as a policy or more specifically a privacy access control rule, might be
”I only want to share my interests with my friends”.
Privacy policies clearly exist outside computer system environments, and
certain challenges arise when they need to be translated into computer com-
mands in order to be enforced. Natural languages, like English, are often not
precise enough for a computer to read unambiguously. That is why languages,
some based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML) syntax, have been
introduced, as a way for system administrators to translate policies stated
in human languages, into something a computer can understands. Examples
of such languages are P3P, EPAL and XACML which are presented in the
following subsections.
2.2.2 P3P
P3P, is the Platform for Privacy Preferences, a standard developed by the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), described in [Conb]. The work with
38 Background
P3P was initiated after the first W3C Privacy Workshop ([Conc]) that took
place in Dulles/Virginia in 2002, as a way for web sites to communicate
their privacy practices and to increase user privacy awareness. The standard
describes a way for websites to express their privacy practices in a standard
format that is automatically retrievable by user agents. After retrieval, the
web site’s privacy practices will be easily interpreted by the user agent, and
users can be informed of its content in both human- and machine-readable
formats. The standard thus allows software to interpret web sites’ privacy
practices and make automated decisions based on these practices. The user
are then able to configure such software to make decisions based on matching
the user’s privacy preferences against the site’s privacy practices where the
user is only bothered when conflicts arise.
This standard will hopefully create incentives for web sites to make their
privacy practices more open to the public, and therefore push them to behave
in a more privacy friendly way. Browsers get the chance to implement smart
interfaces to make the users aware of and understand privacy implications of
Internet browsing, and thus creating the incentive for web sites to be open
and well behaved when it comes to privacy handling.
2.2.3 EPAL
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) is a formal language for
stating enterprise privacy policies, where an Information Technology (IT)
system governing data handling can make decisions based on such policies.
The data handling is governed according to fine-grained positive and negative
authorization rights. It was submitted to W3C by IBM on November 10. in
2003, and is described in detail in [AHK+]. In [AHK+] you can find their
mission statement, and it is as follows:
”The EPAL Working Group exists to develop a interoperability
language for the representation of data handling policies and prac-
tices within and between privacy-enabled enterprise tools, which
serve to
• Enable organizations to be demonstrably compliant with
their stated policies.
• Reduce overhead and the cost of configuring and enforcing
data handling policies.
• Leverage existing standards and technologies.”
A company in need for privacy enforcement will typically add a privacy
enforcement system in their software package. Privacy rules are then set
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up by one or more privacy administrators, requiring no programming skills.
The privacy enforcement system will then enforce these EPAL privacy rules
and obligations. EPAL is thus only a language where the privacy rules and
obligations are described, and require the implementation of an enforcement
system to enforce privacy.
The EPAL language is written in well-formed XML, conforming to XML
1.0, and must be validated by the already defined XML Schema for EPAL,
[AHK+]. A schema defining the vocabulary for sector-specific privacy policies
is also required. Based on this vocabulary, the privacy rules and obligations
for the specific sector are defined in XML, where what is allowed and what
is denied is formalized. Each policy contains the following elements;
Policy information - Information describing the policy.
EPAL vocabulary reference - Reference to the vocabulary.
Conditions - Zero or more condition elements (conditions can be evaluated
to true or false, and a rule can be applied only if all the conditions are
evaluated to true).
Rules - Zero or more rule elements which will define the actual privacy rules
of the policy which together define the authorizations of the policy.
2.2.4 XACML
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a standard for
stating, interpreting and enforcing privacy policies. It has been developed by
the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS), which is a not-for-profit consortium working on making new and
better IT-standards ([ftAoSISO]). XACML 2.0 is currently the last pub-
lished version, and XACML 3.0 is under construction. The original version,
XACML 1.0 is described in [ftAoSISO03].
XACML consists of two parts, the declarative access control policy lan-
guage, and an associated processing model, interpreting such XACML poli-
cies. The processing model will be discussed in Section 2.2.5 below (”Privacy
policy enforcement architectures”), as XACML share such a processing model
with other privacy policy language standards.
XACML privacy policy language
The XACML policy language is written as XML. It is structured into 3 levels
of elements:
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Policy Set - Can contain other Policy Sets and Policy elements, plus a
policy-combining algorithm and optionally a set of obligations. Obli-
gations are descriptions of what must be carried out before or after
access is granted (e.g. logging the request).
Policy - Will typically contain one or more Rule elements, a rule-combining
algorithm identifier and optionally a set of obligations.
Rule - Consists of a Target, an Effect and Conditions.
Target - Consists of Subjects, Resources and Actions.
A privacy policy is defined with a collection of Rules contained in a Policy
element. The XACML rules refers to subjects, resources, etc. that previously
have been formally defined in XML for the relevant domain. The following
is an example of a Rule defined in XACML taken from [ftAoSISO03]:
<Rule RuleId= ” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
:example :S impleRule1 ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Desc r ip t i on>
Any sub j e c t with an e−mail name in the medico . com
domain can perform any ac t i on on any r e sou r c e .
</Desc r i p t i on>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: funct ion : r f c822Name−match”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 : s u b j e c t : s u b j e c t−id
” DataType=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
:data−type:r fc822Name”/>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=”
u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0 :data−
type:r fc822Name”>medico . com</Attr ibuteValue>
</SubjectMatch>
</ Subject>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resources>
<AnyResource/>
</Resources>
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<Actions>
<AnyAction/>
</Act ions>
</Target>
</Rule>
The XACML Privacy Policy Profile, as presented in [ftAoSISO10], also
has the framework for stating purposes. The holder of information can state
the purpose for why that piece of information was gathered, and the entity
requesting access must accordingly state the purpose for why the information
is requested. This creates the foundation for matching these two purposes
such that privacy policies can be enforced under the correct conditions. Ac-
cess should only be granted if the requester intends to use the information
for the same purpose as it was gathered.
GeoXACML is an extension to the OASIS XACML specification, which
has been adopted by the OGC and is currently under control of the spec-
ification Revision Working Group, before releasing the final GeoXACML
specification ([Cona]). This addition will add geo-specific elements to the
XACML language, and allow decisions to be based on geographical data.
2.2.5 Privacy policy enforcement architectures
There exists multiple languages for defining privacy policies, where P3P,
EPAL and the XACML language have been described above. Only defin-
ing such policies by means of different kinds of rules is not enough to en-
force such policies, there must exist a system who will interpret and enforce
them in the correct manner. [And05] explains how Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have
defined an abstract model for EPAL and XACML policy enforcement. Figure
2.10 shows how EPAL or XACML policies are interpreted and enforced in a
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) respec-
tively. It also illustrates how these two components relates to applications,
resources and attributes in a system. As the figure shows, an application
will request access to a resource from the PEP. The PEP will, in abstract
terms, lie between the entity requesting a resource and the resource itself,
controlling access. The request will be forwarded to where the decision will
be made, the PDP. The PDP retrieves relevant policies and attributes, and
makes a decision based on these. It will then notify the PEP of the decision,
and the PEP will grant or not grant access to the resource in question accord-
ingly. In addition to notifying the PEP of whether or not to grant access to
a resource, the PDP can forward relevant Obligations found in policies used.
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Obligations were presented in the section above, as part of the XACML lan-
guage, and states what the PEP is obligated to do when a certain policy is
consulted. One example is making the PEP log the request.
Figure 2.10: This figure illustrates the abstract privacy enforcement model
for EPAL and XACML described above. It shows how access control is
enforced through the Policy Enforcement Point(PEP) and the Policy Deci-
sion Point(PDP), and how they relate to the environment of applications,
resources, policies and attributes. The figure is taken from [And05]
2.2.6 Privacy policy referencing
Privacy policies stated in a legal context by companies or through a GUI
by a user should not only be enforced in a system, but understood by users
and verifiable by outsiders so that they are able to audit how systems handle
personal data. This sort of audit and verification can reveal whether these
services’ technical practices for data handling matches what they claim in
their stated privacy policies. A paper by Audun Jøsang, Lothar Fritsch and
Tobias Mahler called ”Privacy Policies Referencing”, [JFM10], propose an
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infrastructure for privacy policy referencing. The infrastructure is composed
of a technical, a policy, a management and a legal framework for how ser-
vice providers can specify privacy policies for personal data in their systems,
and how technical compliance with the policies can be verified by users or
third-party auditors. The paper proposes adding metadata to personal in-
formation, with a discussion of the format standardization, the creation, the
management and legal aspects of such metadata. This kind of metadata will
state how the relevant data should be treated in the system. When data
travels the system or collaborating systems, this metadata will ensure it is
treated in compliance with the metadata description, and thus the stated
privacy policies.
2.3 Emerging privacy issues in the new IT-
technologies
This section is loosely based on Chapter 6, Section 4, in the book by Elena
Ferrari [Fer10], called ”Further research directions in access control”. This
subchapter discusses four such new research directions, ”Trust compilation”,
”Access control and privacy for mobile users and location-based services”,
”Going beyond traditional access control and privacy-preserving mechanisms”
and ”Information accountability”. Following is a compilation of the most rel-
evant points for this master thesis.
2.3.1 Online Social Networks access and privacy con-
trol requirements
There is no denying that social networking has become a big part of today’s
information society. SNSs are everywhere, examples include the largest ones;
Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, countless online dating sites; FriendFinder,
eHarmony, etc., the discussion and collaboration SNSs; Orkut, SlideShare,
Socialcast, etc. and last but not least the relatively new LASNSs; Foursquare,
Gowalla, Brightkite, Google Buzz and Facebook Places.
Driving the development of such services are often the anticipation of new
features, cool tools, access to all sorts of data in all kinds of ways. People
and enterprises are sharing more and more personal and sensitive data in
search for social and organizational benefits or other ways to exploit these
services fully. There are benefits to be reaped, but there are also negative
consequences when it comes to privacy. Seeing as these services will handle
vast amounts of personal and sensitive data they should have correspondingly
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strict access control requirements to protect the privacy of its users. When
new features drive the development of these services, and there is a race
for deploying them as fast as possible, privacy often suffers. The concept
of privacy will in some cases only be brought to people’s attention when
there is a severe problem or breach of trust within one of the services they
are currently using. For many users, privacy will not be a deciding or even
existent factor in the decision-making process of whether or not to use such
services (or which one to choose). Lack of privacy in some shape might even
be a requirement for a service or feature to be able to work properly. This
leads to the pattern where services are deployed without much concern for
privacy, and when such concerns are raised, at a later point in time, privacy
will be more or less addressed. This pattern exists because the developers
of SNSs do not have adequate incentives for implementing strict access and
privacy control, seeing as large portions of the public seems to not understand
the risks or do not care about this kind of privacy (or they might not consider
it an important enough factor in the choice of whether or not to use different
kinds of SNSs). That is why one important further research area is a way
to make the public understand privacy and the risks involved when sharing
personal or sensitive information through SNSs. In addition to understanding
the risks, the public should be able to check the privacy policies of an SNS (for
instance by using P3P plus easily understandable GUI interfaces to display
a website’s privacy policies in a browser). This might create incentives for
the developers of SNSs to include more strict access and privacy control in
their product.
Mobile and Location Privacy
As mentioned above, LASNSs, like Facebook Places, Foursquare, Gowalla,
Brightkite and Google Buzz, have been developed and are now in use. The
location-awareness will open up a world of possible features for different sce-
narios. One example of such a scenario can be a crowded music concert where
you could check a service on your phone to see if any of your other friends
are nearby, or even at the same concert. Another example is the possibility
of a clothing store communicating daily sales to potential customers in the
area. Still, mobile and location-aware services pose new challenges when it
comes to user privacy and security. You might not want your employer to
know that you were at a bar until 4 am last night, might not want certain
people to know you were at a hospital, and certainly not your stalker or any
untrustworthy person to know that you are home alone at night, or even
that your home is empty. These examples certainly raise awareness of the
risks involved in using LASNS without any concern for privacy. The nature
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of location-awareness causes these SNS systems to face stricter privacy re-
quirements. It should be possible and even easy for any user to tune the
account’s access control panel to match their preferences for how much, to
whom, when, where and in which scenarios they wish to share their location.
2.4 Conclusion
Achieving privacy through access control and privacy policies has been the fo-
cus of previous research. Both computer systems in general, and lately SNSs,
will in most cases implement this kind of control in some form. Today’s
systems, like LASNS systems, handle more and more information, mostly
personal but also corporate sensitive data, and this has created new require-
ments for increasingly strict privacy policies with corresponding enforcement
architecture, protecting both organizations and citizens. Researches and de-
velopers have previously come up with different access control models to
control security and privacy, each applicable for their usual environments.
The new LASNS systems pose new privacy challenges, which still have not
been completely solved, requiring us to use and tailor existing access control
models to fit this new environment.
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Chapter 3
Scenarios
To be able to analyze privacy and access control in SNSs and LASNSs, we
need to come up with privacy requirements for such systems. To be able
to come up with perfectly general privacy requirements we need to consider
all types of user privacy preferences, in all kinds of roles, in all types of
scenarios. Covering all such possible preferences will take an unnecessary
amount of time and effort, and might not even be possible. Instead we come
up with two scenarios in this chapter, which we will base our privacy control
analysis on.
We have to be able to cover many types of users, roles, services and
surroundings through these scenarios, to be able to base our privacy require-
ments on enough actual user preferences. To write these scenarios we will
therefore not use the traditional scenario form with a lengthy textual descrip-
tion of a certain user, using a certain service, in curtain surroundings, at a
certain time, with much unnecessary information. The term ”scenario” is in
this case defined as a type of user using a specific service or type or service,
with different privacy preferences based on different roles, surroundings or
other factors. Each scenario will thus contain the user type, the service used
and a list of privacy preferences such a user might have.
We will only present two scenarios, confined to two different services. The
first one describes a regular person using a SNS and the second a regular
person using SNS with location awareness (a LASNS). The preferences are
based on the author’s experience, imagination and cases where lack of privacy
can be thought to have undesirable effects.
3.1 Scenario 1, SNS
User: Regular Facebook user
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Service: Facebook (only features and apps developed by Facebook’s own
developers, except the location-aware Places feature)
Preference list: (based on time, features/resources or connections/rela-
tionships):
1. As a regular user, I only want close friends to see my profile information.
2. As a student, I want only the people in the same network as me to be
able to find me in searches.
3. As a 50 year old teacher, I want to be invisible to all users except the
ones I have my self requested to be friends with.
4. As a regular user, I only want friends and friends of friends to be able
to send me messages.
5. As a regular user, I want to show the videos I am tagged in only to
friends, except my boss.
6. As a 14 year old girl, I do not want men who are not my friends or
friends of friends to contact me.
7. As a parent, I do not want strangers who are not of a similar age as
my daughter to be able to contact her.
8. As a teenager, I only want to show my interests to friends with similar
interests.
9. As a Norwegian citizen, I wish only to be contacted by strangers who
speak one of the same languages as I do.
10. As regular user, I do not want to be contacted by strangers, unless I
have been tagged in the same photo as them.
11. As a 25 year old guy, I want to show the photo album from the guy-trip
to London only to my close friends, except the close friends who are
also in my family.
12. As a business woman, I do not want my colleagues to see the photos I
am tagged in.
13. As a business woman, I only want my colleagues and acquaintances to
see the places I have checked in to during business hours.
14. As a regular user, I do not want users without a profile picture and
who are not my friend to contact me.
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15. As a regular user, I wish to show my attending status on events only
to my friends and other people who are attending the same events.
16. As a regular user, I wish to hide my photos from strangers.
3.2 Scenario 2, LASNS
User: A Facebook Places user
Service: Facebook Places
Preference list: (based on location or connections/relationships):
1. As a Facebook Places user, I would like the places I check into to only
be visible to my friends.
2. As a Facebook Places user, I would like only people in the vicinity of
where I am to see my check-in.
3. As a Facebook Places user, I would like only my friends who are in the
vicinity to see my location.
4. As a Facebook Places user, I would like to strictly forbid all but a few
trusted users to see my location when I am home.
5. As a Facebook Places user, I would like for my colleagues to be able to
chat with me only when I am at work, at Bank of America.
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Chapter 4
Privacy in Social Network
Services and Platforms
This master thesis will focus mainly on LASNSs. However, in order to an-
alyze relevant privacy control and requirements for these kinds of services
it is useful to take a look at privacy control and requirements for SNSs in
general. It is also valuable for the reader to become familiar with the idea
and structure of SNSs. The first section of this chapter will thus be spent on
a general overview of SNSs.
Section 4.2 will be an analysis of Facebook. We have had more experience
with SNSs in general (seeing as they have been around for longer), and
are particularly familiar with Facebook as a specific case of SNS. We have
therefore chosen to use it as a case to study user privacy control. It is a useful
exercise, applicable to more general cases, to use a specific SNS case to learn
its stated privacy policies, come up with our own privacy requirements for
that service, and eventually analyze the existing privacy control with regards
to those expectations.
Section 4.3 will use the experience gained in the Facebook case study plus
work with different SNSs and LASNSs to present the privacy requirements
we demand from SNSs in general. These requirements will be used as a
foundation to create privacy control requirements for LASNSs in Chapter 5.
4.1 General overview of SNSs
This section gives the reader a useful introduction to SNSs and presents the
most common data model for such services.
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4.1.1 Introduction to SNSs
A Social Network Service (SNS) is an online service or platform, that is often
web based. Its main focus is to build and reflect the social networks or rela-
tions that exist in real life through common arenas or interests (friends, col-
leagues, class mates, fans etc.). The core of the service is the representation
of a user, the user’s relations to other users and communication among them.
SNS’s are thus mostly individual-centered, as opposed to online communi-
ties, which are group centered. The service is often spiced with additional
features, like user profiles, with user-provided information, different kinds of
relationships, and additional features for sharing different types of content.
From the beginning, during the nineties, the World Wide Web (WWW)
was used for sharing content ([War06]). Throughout that decade many ser-
vices emerged for people to interact and share content. In the beginning
these services were often group centered online communities, but in the late
nineties user profiles became a central feature of these web based social net-
works ([Wikf]). One step further was the ability to compile lists of friends,
and the next step was to facilitate more advanced features to find and man-
age relations. Soon SNSs, as we know them today, became very popular, and
now they are a part of most peoples’ online communication habits.
Most SNSs have been developed to serve a particular purpose, or to re-
flect a real life social structure. Many online dating services are basically
SNSs, with the goal of finding and communicating with potential romantic
partners. The core of Classmates.com is to find and re-connect with old
classmates. Linkedin is a SNS specialized in professional profiles and connec-
tions. Facebook, was initially created to link students at Harvard, through
friendships, sharing of content, interaction and user-contributed profile infor-
mation. The newest development is the generation of location-aware SNSs
(LASNSs). The explosion of smartphones and app development for these
devices have opened up possibilities for using a person’s (devices’) location
in SNSs. Facebook has released Facebook Places where users can share their
location with other users through their mobile devices. Other new SNSs have
location awareness as their core service, like Foursquare and Gowalla. This
master thesis will focus mainly on the location-aware SNSs, but some of the
work will be applicable for SNSs in general.
4.1.2 Data models for SNSs
SNS systems contain a lot of data of different types. Relationships, user
information, shared entities and everything else that is the core of such a
system. All this data has to be structured and stored in the back-end sys-
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tem. Many different technologies are used to distribute, access, organize and
display the data, yet ultimately all the information and relations have to be
stored in a storage medium using storage software to manage it. For this
purpose a Database Management System (DBMS) is often used. Facebook,
Twitter and Digg (a web based social network for sharing stories and links)
uses Cassandra ([Cas]). Cassandra is a
”highly scalable second-generation distributed database”
according to their web site, and a system which is especially good at handling
large amounts of data spread out across many physical servers. Linkedin and
Myspace uses Aster Data systems as their DBMS. According to the Aster
Data web site, [Dat], their solution is a
”An Analytic Platform: MPP row and column database with an
integrated analytics engine”.
These kinds of DBMSs hold and manage the huge amounts of data that is
aggregated through the use of SNSs. On top of the DBMSs there will be
layers of different technologies, to pull up and display the data in the way we
are used to seeing it on Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, etc. Examples of such
technologies includes the DBMS query languages, cashing systems, business
layers and web GUI layers.
4.2 Facebook as an example SNS
We have decided to use Facebook as an example SNS. Facebook is a hugely
popular SNS, with millions of users, is well documented, and has support for
mobile features; e.g. Facebook app-development for iOS and Android, with
location-awareness through Facebook Places among others. Facebook was a
huge success from the beginning, first available only to Harvard University
students, and eventually all people of 13 years or older ([Gol09]). The core of
their service is the ability for a user to connect to others (friends), and create a
social network for that user. That social network is called ”The social graph”,
and a user has direct and indirect connections to friends, friends of friends,
etc. Social graphs are not at all unique for Facebook, most social networking
services are probably based on a similar structure, but the Facebook system
had other traits which differentiated it from its competitors. In addition
to the networking capabilities, their developers created popular applications
themselves on top of the social graph. Examples include sharing images and
videos, wall-posting and sharing personal information (relationship status,
current city, interests, etc). This section will examine Facebook’s end-user
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interface, developer platform, user privacy requirements, privacy control and
an analysis of this privacy control in light of the requirements.
4.2.1 End-user Interface
The Facebook system uses a web-interface, where a user will log in at http://
www.facebook.com, and enter the view related to that user. Giving a detailed
description of all the parts offered through the Facebook web interface would
be too time- and page-consuming and unnecessary. This section will focus
only on the parts which will be useful in the work with this thesis. The basic
features and resources related to a user will be listed. To protect a user’s
privacy, it is useful to define which objects is in need of such protection.
Features and Resources
To start the Facebook experience, one has to register as a user, and log into
the user view. The user view will provide options to view or change its own
profile or related elements, or browse the available data in Facebook (open
profiles, search lists, groups, etc.). Facebook offers different features, not
only features and services provided by the Facebook developers, but also
Facebook-related apps and websites by third-party developers through the
Facebook Platform. Examples of features created by the Facebook develop-
ers are; uploading and sharing images and videos, creating, inviting to and
sharing groups and events, writing on friend’s walls and sending Facebook
messages.
After some time the user will be part of an elaborate social network,
with its own wall and profile information plus relations to other users, im-
ages, videos, places, notes, status posts, events, groups and similar, through
Facebook’s numerous types of relationships. A lot of information will be
gathered about the user’s life, friendships, images, videos, religious views,
interests, visited places, etc, and the user will wish to control who has access
to all this information. When speaking of objects or resources to protect,
they could include traditional objects like an image, a wall-post, a message
or similar. Yet, other types of information, which might need protection,
are all types of relationships. A friend-list is a list of relationships for that
user, and he or she might not want strangers to see that list, or any re-
lationship contained in the list. Sometimes the object to protect can be a
relationship plus a traditional object, like an image plus the connection to
the person tagged in it. Thus, when using the term ”object” or ”resource”
when discussing privacy, this could mean all entities containing any type of
information about users and/or their relationships.
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Figure 4.1: This figure shows a screenshot of the main Facebook features and
resources, as presented in the Facebook Help Center.
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the basic usage and features in the Face-
book realm. Further inspection will reveal many user resources, either di-
rectly, like images in ”Photos”, or more indirectly, like a friend relationship
in ”Friends” or any information added to a users ”Profile”. Following is a
break-down of possible objects or resources loosely based on the lists ”Using
Facebook” and ”Facebook Apps and Features” in Figure 4.1.
Friends - A user-user relationship. Either a friendly, romantic or family
relationship.
Networks - A user-network relationship.
Search - Visibility in searches.
Profile - Username, Profile picture(s), gender, spoken languages, relation-
ship status, religious and political views, quotes, entertainment prefer-
ences (books, movies, television, music and games), sports (sports you
play, favorite teams or athletes), activities, interests and all contact
information (email, phone number, address, etc.).
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Messages - A message from one user to another. The content of the message
and the fact that they are messaging each other.
Wall - A wall-post from one user to another.
Home and News Feed - A users status updates, likes and shared links.
The users who are tagged in those status updates.
Photos - An image and its relationships to users through tags.
Video - A video and its relationships to users through tags.
Groups - Group membership, group status (regular member or administra-
tor), group activity (wall-posts, image uploads, etc).
Events - Attendance status (attending, maybe attending and not attend-
ing), event status (regular or administrator), event activity (wall-post,
image uploads, etc.)
Like - The user-like-object relationship.
Notes - The author-note relationship and the content.
Links - The shared link-user relationship.
Birthday - Day and month, plus year.
Chat - The user-user chat relationship, chat log and times chatted.
Places - Places visited and mobile device checked in from (Iphone, Android,
etc.).
All these resources are a part of the Facebook features and user experi-
ence. For one user, a lot of personal information will be collected when using
and being a part of the Facebook network. Different users have different
preferences when it comes to privacy and protection of these objects, and
can even have different preferences based on different scenarios. That is why
Facebook provides a privacy control panel to tune access control for these
objects. The question is whether the control options they provide are good
enough for this purpose, and will facilitate settings which can match these
preferences.
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4.2.2 The Facebook Platform
The Facebook platform was released on May 24th in 2007, a good while after
thefacebook.com was started by Mark Zuckerberg ([Gol09]). It was not until
that point that third party developers were able to utilize all that Facebook
information and infrastructure to build creative applications. The Facebook
Platform gives developers access to information contained in the Facebook
systems through well-defined interfaces, making possible the deployment of
numerous application on top of the platform, probably many more than what
the Facebook developers would be able to think of and create themselves.
Facebook Platform overview
High-level information regarding the Facebook Platform can be found at
http://developers.facebook.com, while the details of the platform, the
Application Programming Interface (API) and language syntax can be found
on their wiki site http://wiki.developers.facebook.com/. There seems
to be three high-level usages for the platform, each introduced through brows-
ing the ”Getting started” section.
Websites - Incorporating Facebook features into your own web site, like
including a ”Like Button” connected to a user’s Facebook account.
Apps on Facebook.com - Creating a Facebook application integrated with
the Facebook core.
Mobile apps - Developing mobile apps, for iOS, Android or other mobile
Operating Systems (OS) using the Facebook Platform.
To achieve this, the Facebook Platform offers a Software Development
Kit (SDK), helpful tools, and most importantly provides the following five
core concepts for development on the platform.
Social Plugins The concept of Social Plugins will allow web site developers
to add social Facebook components directly into their web page. These
components are related to showing likes, comments or shared material from
friends of a Facebook authenticated user. Examples of components listed
on [Devb] includes; The Like Button, Activity Feed (related to your site),
Recommendations, Like Box, Login Button, Registration, Facepile (pictures
of friends who have liked your site), Comment and Live Stream.
[Devb] presents how to include these components into your web site
only using iframes or Facebook’s own markup language Facebook Markup
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Language (FBML) together with JavaScript SDK calling Facebook meth-
ods.
Graph API The core of the Facebook Platform is the Graph API, an in-
terface for external developers to read from and write to Facebook [Devb].
Through this API one can access the social graph (explained above in sub-
section 4.2.2), meaning a unique representation of people and everything
they are connected to (friends, photos, events, pages, etc ) through different
types of relationships (friendships, relationships, photo tags, shared content,
comments, etc).
Social Channels The concept of Social Channels offers access to differ-
ent Facebook-powered social channels which can be incorporated into your
Website, mobile or Apps on Facebook.com. There are three types of chan-
nels; News Feed, Requests and Automatic Channels. At this moment several
Automatic Channels are provided; Bookmarks, Notifications, Dashboards,
Usage Stories and App Profiles & Searches. A further explanation of the
concept of social channels can be found at [Devb].
Authentication The Facebook platform offers a single sign-on mechanism
for both Web, mobile, and desktop applications. For an application to be
able to access the Graph API in the context of a user, both the user and the
app needs to be authenticated and authorized to access the data. When this
has been successfully performed, the app is issued a user access token which
grants access to a user’s information, and to perform actions on behalf of
that user.
Open Graph Protocol The Open Graph Protocol is used to integrate a
Web page into a social graph, and is compatible with and useful for Web
pages representing a real-world entity, a famous person, a food dish, a music
album or similar. If a user browses your page, and clicks your Facebook Like
Button, the entity will be listed in that person’s Likes and Interests section,
and a connection is made between your entity and that user. This kind of
connection enables you to publish updates to all connected users.
Facebook Platform privacy issues
The Facebook Platform enables third-party developers to gain access to
Facebook-related information, through Facebook apps, their web page or
a mobile app. The Facebook Privacy Policy [Fac10] begins by informing the
users that
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”This privacy policy covers all of Facebook. It does not, however,
apply to entities that Facebook does not own or control, such as
applications and websites using Platform”.
Further, section 4 called ”Information You Share With Third Parties: Face-
book Platform” states the following:
”As mentioned above, we do not own or operate the applications
or websites that use Facebook Platform. That means that when
you use those applications and websites you are making your
Facebook information available to someone other than Facebook.
Prior to allowing them to access any information about you, we
require them to agree to terms that limit their use of your infor-
mation (which you can read about in Section 9 of our Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities) and we use technical measures to
ensure that they only obtain authorized information. To learn
more about Platform, visit our About Platform page.”
It seems that while Facebook has taken some measures to protect users
of Facebook Platform services, like making third-party developers formally
agree to limiting terms and ensuring that they only obtain information which
somehow have ended up being labeled ”authorized”, they have no actual con-
trol over what happens with a user’s information after it has been provided
to the third-party developer systems. It is up to the developer to state which
information categories an app requires access to, even if such access might not
really be necessary. The developer of a mobile Facebook app might ask the
user for permission to use the current location of the mobile device, and the
user might press ”Agree” without much thought. The app server might store
information, without telling the user, and even if the user presses ”Agree”
to a long textual list of terms to get access to the app, it is a common fact
that not all users tend to read the agreements carefully. These scenarios can
pose some harmless or more serious privacy issues. Opening up the Facebook
system to third party developers, gives away some of the back-end privacy
control, and might result in vulnerable users taking an app into use without
agreeing with or even knowledge of the privacy implications.
4.2.3 Facebook user privacy requirements
To be able to analyze existing privacy, and further to propose improved pri-
vacy control for LASNSs, we need to take a look at existing privacy policies
plus privacy and access control requirements to compare against the actual
implementation. We will first examine Facebook’s own privacy policies. The
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analysis of whether the relevant policies and other privacy requirements have
been fulfilled will be aimed towards Facebook’s user privacy and access con-
trol. As explained in Chapter 3 ”Scenarios”, it is impractical to consider all
scenarios, for all user types and roles, in all surroundings. We will therefore
base these requirements, in which we will evaluate Facebook privacy control
against, on Scenario 1. Scenario 1 is based on a regular Facebook user, and
contains a variety of roles, surroundings, and possible preferences.
After the presentation of Facebook privacy policies, we will establish our
own privacy and access control requirements in which to compare the actual
implementation against, in Section 4.2.5. There are two general high-level
requirements when it comes to user privacy control. The first one is privacy
awareness. The user should be aware of what data is stored, which personal
data needs to be protected and how to protect it. The second is actual
privacy control. The system should offer a reasonably extensive control menu
or control panel to limit limit access to data according to their preferences.
User privacy preferences will vary from user to user and scenario to scenario,
and there are no universal conclusions as to what one should expect from
the Facebook system in this regard. The privacy control requirements we set
forth will thus be based on possible user privacy preferences, as well as the
author’s own opinion of the level of privacy a user can reasonably expect.
The Facebook privacy policy
One can read the current Facebook privacy policy at [Fac10]. It consists of
a set of privacy policies regarding different types of information with regards
to different receiving subjects. It consist of the following sections:
1. Introduction
2. Information We Receive
3. Sharing information on Facebook
4. Information You Share With Third Parties
5. How We Use Your Information
6. How We Share Information
7. How You Can Change or Remove Information
8. How We Protect Information
9. Other Terms
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Each section describes in quite detail what kind of information it is regarding,
and often what kind of control a user has of such sharing. They do not state
any broad privacy policies, but addresses each (group of) information-subject
relations separately. The first sections (except the introduction) describes
what kind of information a user will directly and indirectly share with the
Facebook system, everyone in general and third parties, respectively. The two
following sections describe how Facebook uses and shares your information.
”How You Can Change or Remove Information” explains exactly that, while
”How We protect Information” explains which steps Facebook has taken to
protect personal information. That section also contains a small subsection
describing ”Risks inherent in sharing information”, which seems to in fact
be a section which releases Facebook from any responsibilities for security or
privacy breaches in their systems, by informing that
”...no security measures are perfect or impenetrable.”
The privacy policy has however changed multiple times since the begin-
ning of Facebook. This blog post from 2010, ”Facebook’s Eroding Privacy
Policy: A Timeline” [Dee10], describes how the company’s stated privacy
policy has changed from 2005 to 2010, in the direction of eroding privacy
and less user privacy control. When searching the web for cites of the Face-
book privacy policy one can find different citations, which can no longer be
found in the current policies. The article at Web Identity [Ide08] writes in
2008 that
”Facebook’s privacy policy begins with a statement of Facebook’s
’core principles’”.
These two core principles are further listed:
1. ”You should have control over your personal information.”
2. ”You should have access to the information others want to share.”
This allegedly stated core privacy policy can not be found in the current
privacy policy, which can lead us to believe that is was removed as the privacy
policy has evolved and might no longer suit the first principle in all cases.
Privacy awareness requirements
Users can not make enlightened privacy control decisions if they are not
aware of which objects they need to protect. As Facebook users spend time
on Facebook, a lot of personal data will be gathered. Initially, when new
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to Facebook, the user should be informed by the Facebook system what
information they should protect, and how to do it. A profile should have the
recommended privacy settings for a regular user as a default, and the user
should be informed of the potential dangers of exposing too much personal
information and how to set up adequate access control for this information.
In addition, there should be clear guidelines and rules for which data
third-party developers will get access to, and how they handle it (how long
it is stored, who it is disclosed to, etc.). In addition to the rules, the user
needs to be informed of apps’ data gathering and handling before taking such
services into use.
As diving into the issue of privacy awareness would greatly increase the
scope of this thesis, and demand much more time than what is set for such
a thesis, this issue will not be discussed further.
Privacy control requirements
The 16 privacy preferences stated in Scenario 1, can be transformed into
more general privacy and access control requirements for Facebook. As a
user I wish to tune the access rights for certain subjects to all my personal
information objects based on:
1. Type of object - Set different access control rules for different types of
objects, like images, tags and videos, friend-list, profile information,
etc.
2. Subjects - Allow or disallow certain users access to an object, with the
ability to except others. Capabilities to block certain users from all
contact.
3. Relationships - Allow or disallow access to an object based on the sub-
jects relationship with the object owner. Examples could include ro-
mantic relationships, friendships, Facebook history (chat, wall posting,
etc.) and family relationship.
4. Roles - Allow or disallow access to an object based on the role of the sub-
ject in relation to the owner. Example roles could include colleagues,
parents or system administrator.
5. My attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on my
profile attributes. For instance: ”I wish to show my interests only to
people with similar interests”.
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6. Subject’s attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
the subject’s attributes. For instance, allowing access only to subjects
of a certain age, speaking a particular language, of a certain gender,
part of a specific network, with the existence of a profile picture.
7. External attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
external factors, like time of day, month or year.
4.2.4 Facebook user privacy control
Facebook accounts have a control panel to tune account privacy settings to
match the user’s privacy preferences. The purpose of the Facebook privacy
control panel is to control which people have which types of access to all
these objects. The shape of the GUI for privacy control is thus often a list
of textual descriptions of the object and type of access in question, plus the
corresponding user choice for which subjects are allowed to perform such
access on the object. Each row in the panel can be seen as an access control
rule with the following format: ”Subject S is allowed to perform access A
on object O” , where object and access type are pre-defined by Facebook,
while only the subject is user defined. Figure 4.2 is a screenshot of the main
entrance view of the privacy control panels:
64 Privacy in Social Network Services and Platforms
F
ig
u
re
4.
2:
T
h
is
fi
gu
re
is
a
sc
re
en
sh
ot
of
th
e
m
ai
n
F
ac
eb
oo
k
p
ri
va
cy
p
an
el
,
w
h
er
e
cu
rr
en
t
p
ri
va
cy
se
tt
in
gs
ar
e
d
is
p
la
ye
d
,
p
lu
s
li
n
ks
to
th
e
si
te
s
w
h
er
e
th
e
p
ri
va
cy
ca
n
b
e
ch
an
ge
d
.
Facebook as an example SNS 65
Figure 4.3: This figure shows a screenshot of an example Facebook privacy
control rule, with a pre-defined object with a certain type of access, and the
user choice for which subjects should be allowed access to that specific access
type-object combination.
Figure 4.3 shows an example access control rule from Facebook’s privacy
control panel. As can be seen in the figure, the subject being granted access
to the object can be chosen from a drop-down list. This list will differ slightly
with different combinations of object and access type, but the following list
includes all the possible drop-down subject choices Facebook provides.
• Everyone
• Friends and Networks
• Friends of Friends
• Friends Only
• Customize
Through the Customize option the user is redirected to a special panel with
two specification options; ”Make this visible to...” and ”Hide this from...”.
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, the user is able to make the object visible
to ”Friends of Friends”, ”Friends Only”, ”Only me” or ”Specific People...”
which is specified as a list of Facebook usernames or self-defined groups. The
user can specify who the object will be hidden from as well, and this is also
stated as a list of Facebook usernames or self-defined groups. A self-defined
group can be created in the ”Edit Friends” menu, and is a list of friends,
with a self-defined group name.
The granularity of subject specification is relatively coarse. Only Friends,
Networks, Individuals or self-defined groups can be granted or denied access.
The ”Customize” choice creates more fine-grained privacy control possible,
through the use of self-defined groups, but this option is not available for all
access rules in the category ”Connecting on Facebook”. One example of a
rule without this choice is the ability to ”Send you message”, which can only
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Figure 4.4: This figure is a screenshot of the interface for customization of
which subjects can access an object in certain ways.
be specified for ”Everyone”, ”Friends of Friends” and ”Friends Only”, which
means that you can not block a group of users from sending you messages,
unless you block all of them through the ”Block List” interface, blocking all
Facebook interaction.
As stated before, Facebook has defined which objects and which types of
access a user can control. The control menu allows a user to tune the privacy
for four basic information object types; ”Connecting on Facebook”, ”Sharing
on Facebook”, ”Apps and Websites” and ”Block Lists”. Each of these types
contain relevant objects, for instance ”Sharing on Facebook” contains a list of
your uploaded images, relationships and your birthday among others, while
”Connecting on Facebook” will let you tune which people are allowed send
you messages or see your friend-list.
Connecting on Facebook This panel, shown in Figure 4.5, will control
the information people use to find you on Facebook. Your name, profile
picture, gender and networks will be visible to everyone by default, and
this can not be changed. You can however control who can find you in
searches, send you friend requests and messages, see information like your
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Figure 4.5: This figure is a screenshot of the Facebook interface for privacy
settings controlling the information people use to find a you as a user on
Facebook.
friend-list, education, work, current city, hometown, likes, activities and other
connections.
Sharing on Facebook The panel used for customizing the privacy of in-
formation shared about you, contains three categories of objects to be pro-
tected. ”Things I share”, ”Things others share” (which are related to you in
some way) and ”Contact information”. Following are listed all the objects
contained within these three categories. They are listed with the object name
followed by the type of protection Facebook offers for that object. The type
”Subjects” indicates that the user can choose from a drop-down menu one of
the subjects from the subject-list presented above. The type ”Enable/Dis-
able” indicates that access to the object can be enabled or disabled by the
user. ”Things I share” includes these objects:
• Posts by me - Subjects
• Family - Subjects
• Relationships - Subjects
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• Interested in - Subjects
• Bio and favorite quotations - Subjects
• Website - Subjects
• Religious and political views - Subjects
• Birthday - Subjects
• Places I check in to - Subjects
• Include me in ”People Here Now” after I check in - Enable/Disable
”Things others share” includes these objects:
• Photos and videos I’m tagged in - Subjects
• Can comment on posts (Includes status updates, friends’ Wall posts,
and photos) - Subjects
• Suggest photos of me to friends - Enable/Disable
• Friends can post on my Wall - Enable/Disable
• Can see Wall posts by friends - Subjects
• Friends can check me in to Places - Enable/Disable
”Contact information” includes these objects:
• Address - Subjects
• IM screen name - Subjects
• <email addresses> - Subjects
Apps and Websites When a user connects to an app or website, the
app or website will automatically have access to username, profile picture,
gender, networks, the user’s friend-list and any information the user has
chosen to share with everyone. For everything else, the user has to specify
privacy preferences related to app and website use and interactions, and for
every app, define which objects the user wishes to share with that app. The
menu for general privacy preferences for app and website use is depicted in
Figure 4.6, while the panel for controlling the privacy settings for one app in
particular is shown in Figure 4.7:
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Facebook has grouped different information objects into categories (for
instance ”Access my basic information”), and defined the access type and
content in the textual description. As can be seen in Figure 4.7, the app
developer will mark access to different information categories as required or
not. The user can only remove access to the categories which are not required
by the app. One example where a category is strictly required for the app to
work properly could be an app which uses family and relationship information
to create a family tree for the user in question, and thus requires access to
the family and relationship information category. One example where an
information category is required by the app, for no apparent reason, is the
required access to a user’s photos and videos by the Spotify app, seeing as
Spotify is a music streaming program (as seen in Figure 4.7).
Block Lists This panel, shown in Figure 4.8, allows Facebook users to
administrate blocked people, apps and the interaction from these. From this
menu a user is able to block interaction from specific strangers, block app
and event invites from specific friends and block certain apps from contacting
you or using your information. All blocked strangers, friends or apps have to
be uniquely specified by email, username, appname or similar, thus Facebook
does not provide the option to block entities based on certain criteria (e.g. a
group membership).
4.2.5 Facebook privacy control analysis
We will analyze the Facebook privacy control presented in the section above
with regards to the current Facebook privacy control in Section 4.2.3 and our
Facebook privacy requirements outlined in Section 4.2.3, in turn.
Facebook privacy policy It seems that Facebook has, instead of keeping
a general privacy policy saying for instance that a user should be able to
control what is shared about that user, tailored their privacy policy state-
ment to address information elements separately to suit all the cases where
the user can not control what is shared. It is also a place to release all their
responsibilities for security and privacy, and place it on the user. The fol-
lowing citation from their privacy policy section about how they protect a
user’s information embodies this point:
”Although we allow you to set privacy options that limit access to
your information, please be aware that no security measures are
perfect or impenetrable. We cannot control the actions of other
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Figure 4.8: This figure is a screenshot of the Facebook interface for block list
administration.
users with whom you share your information. We cannot guar-
antee that only authorized persons will view your information.
We cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will
not become publicly available. We are not responsible for third
party circumvention of any privacy settings or security measures
on Facebook. You can reduce these risks by using common sense
security practices such as choosing a strong password, using differ-
ent passwords for different services, and using up to date antivirus
software.”
This means that Facebook promises little in their privacy policy statement,
opening for less privacy in their systems, and less user control. Because of
the lenient privacy policy, one can say that the implemented privacy con-
trol, described in Section 4.2.4 is very compliant with their privacy policy
statement.
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Our privacy requirements Analyzing the Facebook user privacy control
with regards to our privacy requirements in Section 4.2.3 will reveal weaker
privacy control. In that section we presented seven requirements for how
a user should be able to control personal information. Out of the seven
requirements, Facebook’s current privacy control only fully meet the first
two requirements. Requirement 1, setting different access control rules for
different types of objects, has been met through the function where users can,
for Facebook’s previously defined object-access type couples, set which people
can perform that type of access on the objects of that type. Requirement
2, regarding the granularity for which subjects can be allowed access to an
object, stating that one should be able to allow or disallow certain users
access to an object, is also met. This is not met through the drop-down
menu choices ”Everyone”, ”Friends and Networks”, ”Friends of Friends”,
”Friends Only”, but through the ”Customize” option where one can specify
certain individuals or group of individuals one wishes to allow or hide the
object from.
The rest of the requirements, 3 through 7, are not fully met with current
privacy control. Requirement 3, allowing or disallowing access to an object
based on the relationship between the relevant user and the subject request-
ing the access, is only partially met. The previously mentioned access control
rule subject drop-down menu choices: ”Friends and Networks”, ”Friends of
Friends” and ”Friends Only” will grant subjects access to the object based
on the relationship between the user and subject. Still, the choices are, in
our opinion, too limited. The relationships ”Friendship” and ”in the same
Network” applies to such a coarse-grained grouping of people. Experience
using Facebook tells us that most users have hundreds of friends, and these
often include close friend, childhood friends, co-workers, business associates,
classmates, family, acquaintances and other people one has encountered in
all sorts of settings. Calling all these relationships ”friendships” can seem
very coarse-grained and is not always adequate for making rules that reflect
a person’s privacy preferences. Requirement 4 is closely tied to the demand
for more fine-grained relationships, and is not met with current privacy con-
trol. Being able to state access control rules based on which role a subject
has towards the relevant user, is not possible, and like requirement 3 calls
for a more fine-grained grouping of a user’s ”Friendships”. The three last
requirements, being able to set access rules based on the user’s, the subject’s
or external attributes, are by no means met with the existing control panel.
The control panel fully lacks the option to set conditions under which access
to a specified object should be granted to the specified subject(s). To be able
to fulfill requirement 5, 6 and 7, such options to specify conditions must be
implemented.
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It becomes clear that seen in the light of our privacy control requirements,
Facebook’s current privacy control panel does not provide sufficiently fine-
grained user privacy control through access control of personal information.
The panel lacks sufficiently fine grained subject specification and grouping
of ”Friends”, plus does not provide the option to set conditions under which
the access should be given.
4.3 Privacy requirements for SNSs in general
Through the case study of the privacy control panel in Facebook, we have
thus come up with six general requirements for end-user privacy control:
1. Type of object - Set different access control rules for different types of
objects, like Images, tags and videos, Friend-list, profile information,
etc.
2. Subjects - Allow or disallow certain users access to an object, with the
ability to except others. Capabilities to block certain users from all
contact.
3. Relationships/Roles - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
the subjects relationship with or role towards the owner.
4. Owner attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
owner profile attributes. For instance: ”I wish to show my interests
only to people with similar interests”.
5. Subject’s attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
the subjects attributes. For instance, allowing access only to subjects
of a certain age, speaking a particular language, of a certain gender,
part of a specific network, with the existence of a profile picture.
6. External attributes - Allow or disallow access to an object based on
external factors, like time of day, month or year.
4.4 Conclusion
It is commonly known that SNSs face privacy issues as they often deal with
huge amounts of personal data. We can thus demand more strict user privacy
control from such services. We have used Facebook as an example, analyzing
current privacy control against their own policy and our requirements based
on Scenario 1. This has shown that not even Facebook, one of the biggest
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and most commonly used SNSs, which is based on people sharing their per-
sonal lives with others, is able to meet our demands for user privacy control.
This analysis has provided us with an expected level of granularity for sub-
ject specification and the realization of the need for users to be able to set
conditions under which access should be granted, through a set of privacy
requirements for SNSs in general. This information will be used to improve
privacy control for LASNSs.
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Chapter 5
Privacy in Location-Aware
Social Networks
As the field of IT progresses and new devices are introduced to the market,
developers come up with creative ways to use all the new hardware and
software to make innovative features and new areas of use, some which we
could not have imagined we would need or even want.
Some older phones have been trackable by triangulation (e.g Buddy) or
simple Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers used for tracking of emer-
gency calls ([Shi10]). Yet, we will narrow the discussion of LASNSs to pri-
marily include smartphones as possible devices for such services. There
are two reasons for this; 1) smartphones often have the required positioning
hardware and software making location awareness accessible to additional
software (apps and programs), and 2) as this master thesis focus on location
awareness in SNSs, we need to limit the device type to include only those
regularly used for social networking, thus including most smartphones.
The volume of smartphones being developed, produced and sold is grow-
ing, and more and more people carry a smartphone around wherever they
go. PCmag.com defines a smartphone in the following way:
Definition A cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet ac-
cess. Smartphones provide digital voice service as well as text messaging,
e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 player, video viewing
and often video calling. In addition to their built-in functions, smartphones
can run myriad applications, turning the once single-minded cellphone in to
a mobile computer.
Most of these new smartphones contain embedded GPS receivers and soft-
ware taking advantage of the received data ([Shi10]). Locational data from
a smartphone can be used in a variety of ways to provide the user with
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new functionality and features. Tracking a user on jogging trips, to mea-
sure progress in physical health. An app which maps out the best areas for
picking Chanterelle mushrooms in autumn and records the places you visit
and spend time. An app which based on your location displays the weather
forecast for that place or recommends the best restaurants in the area. A
program that checks which of your friends are in the area, and provides a
way for you to contact them. These are all examples of possible apps for
iPhones, Android phones, and phones with similar capabilities.
As users usually carry their smartphones around with them, the locational
data will often track the user’s geographical movements, thus becoming the
source of sensitive personal data. That is why, even if the potential benefits
and useful areas are huge, such information pose threats to user privacy. An
Android phone user can download a Location-aware (LA) app from Android
Market, a place where anyone can upload their code. How can that user
protect its (the phone’s) geographical movements from unlawful disclosure
to other users, the developers of the app or other interested parties, and why
can this be undesirable?
This chapter will first investigate the nuts and bolts of location awareness
in mobile devices in general, then address how such a feature can be used in
company with SNSs. Following this, we will look into examples of LASNSs.
All the mentioned subsections will contain a part where privacy in relation
to the relevant subject is discussed.
5.1 Location-aware mobile services
LA mobile services are services provided through a mobile device, in this
case a smartphone, which uses the device’s location to provide some useful
information or a feature. To be able to fully understand LASNSs, we will
first dig in to the underlying technology and privacy implications of mobile
location awareness in general.
5.1.1 Underlying technology overview
For mobile producers or third party developers to be able to develop and
provide LA services for a device, it requires the underlying technologies to
support such services. A device has to contain the two following (abstract)
components:
1. A GPS receiver (or components facilitating other positioning techniques
like Wi-Fi or cellular tower triangulation information).
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2. A processing component.
According to Wikipedia, ([Wikd]) GPS is
”...a space-based global navigation satellite system (GNSS) that
provides location and time information in all weather and at all
times and anywhere on or near the Earth when and where there
is an unobstructed line of sight to four or more GPS satellites.
It is maintained by the United States government and is freely
accessible by anyone with a GPS receiver.”
As mentioned before, most new smartphones contain a GPS receiver, and
can thus, when in line of sight to four or more of these satellites, receive
sufficient information to calculate their geographical position. The three
basic components of GPS are: absolute location, relative movement and
time transfer. Absolute location is the most relevant one for LASNSs and
this master thesis. If a smartphone can not connect to enough satellites,
most phones today can derive their location, although less accurately, by
using information from cell towers or a Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) connection.
This is at least true for both iPhone OS (iOS) and the Android platform,
as discussed below. These phones thus have three location-aware hardware
options:
1. GPS receiver
2. Wi-Fi connections
3. Cell tower triangulation
Whether the phone has a GPS receiver, Wi-Fi or cell tower information,
the device has to contain logic which will, based on some or all of this infor-
mation, calculate or process the device’s location as accurately as possible. If
the location is to be made accessible to third party developers, this hardware
or software also has to provide a standard format and interface for these ap-
plication to get the location and to use it in their services. This processing
component will thus have to first figure out the most accurate source of loca-
tion information at the time (GPS, cell towers or Wi-Fi ), then calculate the
location, and lastly provide the location in a format readable by LA service
programs or apps.
Usually the geographical location will be presented to programs and apps
as latitude and longitude coordinates, which will uniquely identify any loca-
tion on earth through a pair of numbers, one for latitude and one for longi-
tude ([Wikc]). Together they make up a sort of coordinate system, based on
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the equator and the chosen prime meridian through the Royal Observatory,
Greenwich, UK.
Take the iPhone, which is currently one of the most popular smartphones
on the marked, as an example of such technology. Apple has made avail-
able to external developers location information from the iPhone’s hardware
through their iOS framework called ”Core Location”. According to Apple’s
own description of the framework ([Lib]) it
”... lets you determine the current location or heading associated
with a device. The framework uses the available hardware to
determine the users position and heading.”
This framework is open to iOS app developers, and these apps will later
reach the users through the Apple app store. This post: [Fle08] explains
how iPhone in 2008 was upgraded so that it was able to use Wi-Fi signals to
determine the phone’s location in addition to cell tower triangulation. iPhone
3G was released in july that same year, and this new model came equipped
with a built-in GPS receiver, making tracking the phone’s location much more
accurate ([Gre08]). Later iPhone models thus have the ability to determine
the phone’s location using all three types of location-aware hardware (GPS,
cell tower triangulation or Wi-Fi connections) based on what is best at the
time.
Figure 5.1: This figure shows an example of a location-aware app developed
for both iOS and the Android Platform, called ViewRanger. The figure is
taken from [nav10]
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Another example of a smartphone OS which is widely used these days is
the Android platform. It is an open source project led by Google, and the
core is an open-source software stack for mobile devices. Android also has a
developer framework which is accessible to external developers. These devel-
opers will release their apps on Android Market, where users can download
and take the apps into use. The Android framework, like the iOS frame-
work, contains a package which provides the developer with locational data
from the phone’s hardware and software. This package provides data from a
multitude of locational sources, just like the iPhone’s OS. These include the
GPS receiver, Cell-IDs and Wi-Fi information ([Deva]).
5.1.2 Privacy implications
The thought of having to wear a device around your neck which tracks your
every move and stores it, can seem more like some sort of punishment than
technological progress. Locational data is very personal, as much more per-
sonal data can be derived from it. Imagine tracking a person’s every step
for a year, and try to think about which questions regarding that person’s
life you would be able to answer by investigating that data. Where does she
work? Most weekdays she spends her time at a Bank of America branch
office, so she probably works there. Does she have a car? Yes, she is al-
ways on the highway. No, she spends time in bus-stops, so probably takes
the bus. Does she take vacations? Yes, she goes to very expensive resorts
and probably has a lot of money. No, she spends time in the mountains,
and is probably a sporty person. Does she have many friends? Yes, she is
always at restaurants and other people’s houses. Maybe not, as she spends
most days in her apartment. Does she cook a lot? No, she always goes and
gets take-away from the chinese food place around the corner. What kind
of clothes does she buy? She often spends time in cheap clothing stores, so
probably buys them there. Does she go to an expensive hairdresser? Has
she been to the doctor lately (a fact most insurance companies would love
to know). Now imagine you gain access to all her friends’ and colleagues’
locational data for that year. Now you can answer many of these questions
with a much higher probability, plus many, many more. Does she visit her
mom often? Does she have a boyfriend? Which of her friends does she hang
out with the most? Now, if that person was you, try to imagine how you
would feel about disclosing all this information.
Privacy means different things to different people, and is often relative
to how private a person likes to be. Regardless of this, most these questions
are highly personal and sensitive, and the author certainly would very much
dislike if she could not control who knew such information about her.
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As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, as people strive
to be available and ”online” at all times, they end up carrying around their
smartphones wherever they go. This means that the location of your phone,
most often will coincide with your location. Already most smartphones con-
tain equipment to track themselves in multiple ways, by GPS data mostly.
Thus, the only difference between us wearing a device around our neck track-
ing and storing our every move, is whether or not this data is stored.
Lately many articles have been posted regarding news that iPhones con-
tain an unencrypted secret file that logs and stores locations plus correspond-
ing time-stamps. One example is this article from the Guardian: ”iPhone
keeps record of everywhere you go”, [Art11]. The file contains the latitude
and longitude coordinates plus a time-stamp of all the phone’s recorded
locations. With this file it is possible to get a good view of the owner’s
movements since the phone was taken into use (after the alleged start of
the recording with Apple’s iOS 4 update in June 2010). This file will also
be transferred to one’s computer when synchronized with an iPhone. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows the result of a program called iPhone Tracker, available at
http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker/, which uses this log file
to create a map of all the recorded locations. This file certainly holds private
Figure 5.2: This figure shows an example of a map generated by the program
iPhone Tracker, using some iPhone’s secret location log file. The figure is
taken from [Bod11]
information. It could possibly be used or abused by the police, phone or
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computer thieves, suspicious spouses, etc., and this raises privacy concerns.
The biggest concern probably has to do with the fact that iPhone users were
unaware of the existence of such a file, and that this example is probably
not the only case where too much information is gathered or stored without
the knowledge or agreement of the user. After a month of massive critique,
Apple has now launched an iOS update, only seven days after they promised
to fix the errors relating to this file. This update makes sure the location log
data is stored for no longer than seven days and, most importantly, the user
can choose for this information not to be logged at all through ”Settings” on
their iPhone([Clu11]).
This example still shows that data will sometimes be stored with or with-
out the user knowing about it or is able to control it. Combined with the
sensitive nature of locational data, it shows there are reasons to be concerned
with privacy when dealing with locational features in smartphones.
5.2 Location-awareness with SNSs
Section 4.1.1 in Chapter 4 explains how SNSs have emerged and been devel-
oping the last decade. Section 5.1.1, above, describes the technology behind
location-aware smartphones and that location awareness has the last few
years become a standard in the most popular phone types (e.g. iPhones and
Android phones). It was only a matter of time before these two technologies
were combined to form LASNSs. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated
to the task of explaining how LASNSs work in general, privacy implications
of using such services, plus a description of a few example LASNSs.
5.2.1 Integration: how it works
A LASNS will combine the information contained in a social network struc-
ture; profile information, relationships, interests, age, etc. with the geo-
graphical information provided by the underlying technology for location
awareness. This could be combined in different ways depending on the idea
of the developers. Following is an incomplete list of possible ideas for such
LASNSs, to illustrate the possibilities for this technology.
• Broadcast your location to friends.
• Post information related to a location for others to find.
• Recommend places nearby based on your stated interests and other
peoples’ recommendations.
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• Broadcast to, or targeted advertising from, businesses nearby based on
your profile information.
• Mark all pictures taken with location information, for your friends or
others to find based on location.
• Find possible dates (through dating SNSs) that are nearby or usually
spend time in the same locations as you.
The technology required to integrate SNSs with LA is first of all a location-
aware device one can carry around (usually a smartphone or another phone
with location awareness) as the location of the human being carrying it
around is what these services are based on. This device has to be able
to connect to the Internet or some network. Being able to communicate data
to and from other users is after all the idea behind most SNSs. Secondly, this
device has to contain, or most often be open for downloading and installing,
a piece of software that the user and the service servers can interact with. For
smartphones like iPhones or Android phones this happens through special
app stores, where users can easily search and find an app, press download,
and it will be installed in seconds. These apps use the OS based framework
for development on these platforms, and the developers will host their own
servers, which the user will interact with through the app and the network.
When developing a LASNS there are roughly three ways to go:
1. Decide to extend your already established SNS with a LA component.
2. Use new LA ideas plus existing social network information (through
APIs) to make a new LASNS app.
3. Develop a new LA idea and collect and create your own social network
information base for the resulting LASNS system.
Some LASNSs are born from already existing and usually web based
SNSs. This is true for Facebook Places, which is an addition to the rest
of Facebook, where Facebook users can download an app on their phone,
and use this to post their locations. Other LASNSs are developed purely
for location awareness, but relies on established SNSs APIs to connect users
to their friends. One example of this is Foursquare, which is based on peo-
ple checking in at different locations, sharing, learning and earning points.
They use an import of your Twitter and Facebook connections to base the
social networking component of the service on. Others, on the other hand,
will develop services with LA in mind, but aims to establish a new social
networking information base. Starting from scratch with no social network
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information can be pretty difficult. You will often have the ”only fax ma-
chine in the world” problem, as the value of the network lies in the number of
connections, and someone has to be first to get the ball rolling. That is why
most new LASNSs will rely on importing connections from existing social
networks like Twitter, Facebook or E-mail contacts, etc.
5.2.2 Privacy implications
When taking LASNSs into use, certain privacy issues will arise because of the
private nature of the information gathered. Section 5.1.2 sheds light on how
locational information is not only personal because of the revelation of one’s
location, but also because of all the other clues it provides about a person’s
life. The new LASNSs are mixing social networks and location information,
and this will add to the privacy concerns of location awareness and SNSs put
together.
Knowing where a person moves provides some information, and knowing
how a group of people travel around and interacts provides even more infor-
mation. Coupling the location of your friends with the relationships between
them, their profile information, their interests, age, posts, activities, etc. can
provide the holder of such information with an elaborate picture of these
individuals’ personal lives. Location awareness poses its own privacy issues,
as do the use of social network services, and combined they will produce
information which the users should be careful who they reveal to.
Another privacy concern regarding LASNSs which is becoming more and
more present is the openness of the smartphone and SNS platforms. As of
today, anyone with moderate programming skills can develop an Android app
and post it to Android Market, and have it be downloaded instantly by users,
with no filtering or control. As mentioned before, the APIs of e.g. Facebook
and Twitter enables developers of new LASNSs to use the the existing social
network information, making it even easier for anyone with a useful LA tool
to quickly deploy and spread such a service. This means that people with a
smart LA idea and possibly impure intentions can develop an app for it, and
start to gather and store all those incoming locations people share as a part of
the service use. As they control this information in their servers, and might
legally own it (depending on formulations in the terms of agreement every
user must accept) they might start selling personal information to whomever
might be interested.
For these reasons, LASNSs, even more than SNSs alone, should provide
the user with sufficient tools to control access to the information gathered in
these system, to ensure a decent amount of privacy.
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5.3 Facebook Places
Facebook Places is an extension to the already existing features, and de-
veloped by Facebook themselves. It allows you to broadcast your location
through a Facebook mobile app whenever you please. Facebook is one of the
biggest SNSs in the world, and thus have a huge existing user base. Most of
these users have been introduced to Facebook Places (FBP) either through
downloading the Facebook app for Android or iPhone, or by watching how
their friends post their location in the news feed from their smartphones. Be-
cause of this valuable introduction to the usage, FBP has great potential for
widespread usage, as more and more people acquire smartphones. Another
advantage with this service is that users have some form of privacy control
through the regular Facebook web interface, meaning we get the chance to
evaluate existing privacy control for such a service. For these reasons we are
going to use FBP as the main LASNS example.
5.3.1 Overview
FBP relies on users to actively push their information to the Facebook (FB)
system. This is done through a FB app on their smartphone. The leftmost
screenshot in Figure 5.3 shows how the FB iPhone app contains a feature
called ”Places”. The first time one enters the FBP feature menu one is asked
whether to allow FB to know one’s location. After accepting this term, you
will be taken to the screenshot to the far right. Here you will see a list of
people nearby, and a list of friends who have checked in elsewhere. To share
your own location you press the ”Check In” button, and enter the menu seen
in the middle screenshot of Figure 5.3. This menu provides the user with
three main options:
• You can add places.
• Check in to existing places.
• Tag people who are with you.
When you and your friends check into a place, this is by default posted to
your profile, in the news feed and the activity stream for that place.
Facebook has opened certain data that will allow any and all developers
to access parts of Places. Initially external developers could only get read
access to check-ins for specific users, pages or places or search the check-
ins of a user’s friends ([DuV10]). At first, only a few of their FBP launch
partners, Gowalla, Foursquare, Yelp and Booyah, was able to push location
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Figure 5.3: This figure shows three screenshots taken from the usage of the
current Facebook Places feature on an iPhone. The figure is taken from [Dig]
information (check-ins) to the FB system on behalf of users ([O’D10]). Now
however, FB provides the developers with a read/write API for check-ins in
FBP ([Par10]). Check-in information can now be accessed or posted through
the Graph API described in Section 4.2.2 and accessed in the same way as
other social graph objects (users, pages, groups, notes, etc).
5.3.2 Privacy control
FBP’ main feature is for users to broadcast their location. The privacy
control panel allows users to control when and who will be able to see their
check-ins.
When One would assume the users are able to control when they choose
to share their location as the act of checking in is a conscious choice. Yet,
the default privacy settings allow a user’s friends to check him or her in.
The regular FB user account privacy settings panel, explained in Section
4.2.4, provides the tool to disable this default setting as depicted in Figure
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5.4. Yet, this means that unless you explicitly prohibit this, you or all your
friends choose whether to reveal your location or not at all times. The write
API for Facebook allows developers to request permission to perform check-
ins on behalf of a user, meaning that the user is able to relinquish the control
of check-ins not only to all their friends but also an external application.
Figure 5.4: This figure shows a screenshot of how Facebook users can toggle
whether friends can check them in to places.
Who Through the regular account FB privacy settings the user can also
control who they allow to see their check-ins. The privacy panel provides
control over two aspects of sharing check-ins, which can both be viewed in
Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: This figure depicts the options Facebook users have to control
who can see their check-ins.
The one called ”Include me in ’People Here Now’ after I check in” has
to do with the FBP feature where a user who just checked in somewhere
can see who else has checked in to the same place regardless of whether they
are friends or not. Whether users wish to share their location with potential
strangers at the places they check into can be set by enabling or disabling
this option in the privacy panel (Figure 5.5). The option is enabled as a
default for all users with one or more other privacy setting(s) allowing access
to ”Everyone” ([dot10]).
The one called ”Places you check in to” is where you control who can
see your check-ins through their news feed, FBP app and your profile. This
is by default set to ”Friends Only” ([dot10]). Figure 5.6 shows the possible
subjects one can choose to receive the right to see your check-ins. As with
the other privacy decisions in Facebook, these are limited to a drop-down
menu of coarse-grained choices plus a customization choice.
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The customization panel that will open when choosing ”Custom” is iden-
tical to to the one explained in Section 4.2.4, ”Facebook user privacy control”,
and depicted there as Figure 4.4. As explained there, the user has the choice
to make visible to certain people, and to hide from certain people.
Figure 5.6: This figure depicts which types of subjects the Facebook users
can give the right to see where they check in.
5.4 Other LASNS examples
In addition to Facebook Places, we will shortly present a few other example
LASNSs. This is to get a better understanding of the different types of
services currently offered using LA, and how the issue of privacy control are
generally solved for these. What all these services have in common is a core;
sharing locations with friends, plus additional functionality to differentiate
themselves from competitors. They all have their users ”check in” to their
current location using a mobile device, and are integrated with Facebook,
Twitter or similar SNSs to find a user’s connections to be able to connect the
user with his or her friends. On top, most of them have developed different
kinds of incentives for the user to check in as often as possible, such as points,
badges, promotional offers, etc.
5.4.1 Foursquare
Foursquare is a LASNS available to users with access to a GPS-enabled
mobile device, such as a smartphone. The service is similar to Facebook as
it expects the users to ”check in” at venues by selecting from a list of venues
based on the user’s location. The users can choose to have their check in
activity automatically posted to their Twitter account, Facebook account or
to both. Figure 5.7 shows how the Foursquare app appears to iPhone users.
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Figure 5.7: This figure shows screenshots from the Foursquare app on an
iPhone. The figure is taken from [Hen10]
They have a point system where points are earned when checking in to
venues. It is possible to earn mayorship at a venue meaning that you are the
one who checked in at that venue most times during the last 60 days (the
check-ins must be valid, only one counts per day, and they must have a profile
photo). The second image in Figure 5.7 shows a special offer retrieved after
achieving mayor status. When someone else beats your record they will take
over mayor status. The users can also earn different badges by checking into
special places, at special times or with high frequencies. Contrary to mayor
status, once a badge is earned the user will have it indefinitely. It is also
possible to achieve three different levels of ”Superuser Status” based on dif-
ferent qualifications such as frequent check-ins and adding new information.
All these features create incentives for users to check in as much as possible,
spurring growth and usage of the service. As check-ins often are posted to
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Facebook and Twitter, frequent Foursquare check-ins will reach many users,
and serve as publicity for the service.
The website http://pleaserobme.com/ is an example of how location in-
formation can be abused. It would crawl public Foursquare posts on Twitter,
and retrieve locational information. It would then allow potential burglars
to search through it for empty homes (the homes of people who through
Foursquare have announced they are somewhere else). It should be men-
tioned that this site was created to shed light on the privacy issues with
people being urged to share their location on Foursquare, not to get people
robbed. Still, according to Wikipedia ([Wikb]), Foursquare had passed 7
million registered users on February 21, 2011.
Figure 5.8: This figure shows a screenshot of Foursquare’s privacy control
panel.
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Privacy control The Foursquare mobile app does not provide the user
with any tools to control their privacy. However, the web interface when a
user logs in at https://foursquare.com/settings provides some amount
of privacy control. You can toggle whether friends see your phone number
and address, and whether everyone can see the links to your Twitter and/or
Facebook accounts, as depicted in Figure 5.8. You can also choose not to
participate in Mayorships, not to be shown in the ’Who’s here’ list in peoples’
mobile apps, not to be included in friends’ Twitter and Facebook status
updates when you are checked into the the same place as them and to not let
local businesses know when you are being a loyal customer (checking in there
frequently). Other than these options, the users have no further control of
who (which of their friends) are able to view their location or when.
5.4.2 Gowalla
Figure 5.9: This figure shows screenshots from the a Gowalla app. The
leftmost screenshot shows how you can monitor friends, while the rightmost
screenshots depicts the check-in panel. The figure is taken from [Tip10]
This service is somewhat similar to Foursquare, and screenshots from the
service is shown in Figure 5.9. You use a GPS-enabled mobile device to check
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in to ”spots”, choosing a spot from a list of spots in the vicinity. Gowalla
check-ins can also be pushed to a user’s Facebook and/or Twitter account.
The rightmost screenshot in Figure 5.9 shows how this service provides the
user with check-in options. Users can leave their own opinions and notes
about these spots and photos taken there. They can also receive digital
”items” by checking in, creating incentives to do so ([Tin10]). These can
be picked up, swapped or dropped, and can be linked to real-world items
or may be promotional items linked to real-world prices. The spot’s details,
activities (people checked in, notes, etc.), photos and marketing items can
be found in the check-in menu as seen in the screenshot to the left. Gowalla
also provides the user with the ability to create and share ”trips”, linking
20 or less spots. These trips can represent nature hikes, sightseeing tours, a
music festival’s recommended spots, park highlights etc.
You can connect your Gowalla account to your Facebook and Foursquare
accounts. This means that Gowalla use your connections from these services,
and can display a friend activity feed as depicted in the leftmost screenshot
in Figure 5.9. As of Gowalla 3, Gowalla supports checking into Facebook
Places and Foursquare in addition to sharing with Twitter ([Wil]). Gowalla
is thus a LASNS connecting to multiple SNSs and another LASNS.
Figure 5.10: This figure shows a screenshot from the Gowalla user privacy
control panel.
Privacy control Gowalla, like Foursquare, does not provide privacy con-
trol through their app, but through their web site where users log in: http:
//gowalla.com/users/username/privacy. They, however, only give the
user the choice to turn privacy on or off as seen in Figure 5.10, with off as
the default position. This setting reflects whether the user wishes to share
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the stamps in their passport (the places they have checked into) and their
items with: everyone (off) or only their friends (imported connections) (on).
Even if you only wish to share with your friends, and place this setting at on,
there are three exceptions where you will still share with everyone: 1) If you
create a new spot, your name will be associated with the spot and visible
to everyone, 2) if you drop an item at a spot, your name will be publicly
associated with both the item and the spot, and 3) if you take a photo at a
spot, the photo will be associated with the spot and available to everyone.
Gowalla’s privacy control leaves the user with no fine-grained control of what
they share and to whom.
5.4.3 Loopt
Figure 5.11: This figure shows screenshots from the Android Loopt app.
The leftmost screenshot show a map with people and places nearby .The
rightmost screenshots show the rest of the Loopt menu. The figure is taken
from [And]
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Loopt is a LASNS with focus on showing users where their friends are
and what they are doing through maps and other interfaces on their mobile
device ([Wike]). It is currently only available on Android and iPhone devices.
When registering as a user you can choose to connect it with your Facebook
account, making available your Facebook friends. It is also possible to change
the profile settings such that all your check-ins are posted on your Facebook
account, Twitter account or both.
As seen in Figure 5.11, the main menu shows the different features of the
service. ”Map”, ”Friends”, ”Lately” (recent activity), ”Check In”, ”Places”
and ”Events” (the menu choices ”Invite” and ”Settings” are less interesting).
The map shows you and your surrounding area, places and friend’s check-ins.
The other menu options let you connect with friends, view recent activity,
check in, view places, see events, invite other people to join or change the
settings.
Privacy control The only privacy control available on your Loopt account
when registering is whether Loopt should share your location automatically
or only when you check in (shown in Figure 5.12). The default option is
”Automatically”, meaning every time you open the Loopt app on your mobile
device. With this, Loopt offers the worst user privacy out of the LASNSs
discussed in this chapter. This observation is based on the fact that in
addition to not being able to make any fine-grained rules for controlling
your data, they not only provide the user with a way to share their location
automatically, this is in fact the default setting.
Figure 5.12: This figure shows the location-sharing control panel for Loopt.
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5.4.4 Brightkite
Figure 5.13: This figure shows a screenshot from a Brightkite app. The figure
is taken from [Als09]
Brightkite is a service based on users connecting to each other, seeing who
is nearby, who has been there before and being able to contact them. Like
the other LASNSs, the user will ”check in” to locations, in this case with an
Android app, iPhone app or by visiting m.brightkite.com with a different
mobile device. Users can choose to share their updates on their Facebook
and Twitter accounts ([Wika]). They can also share their geotagged images
(geographical location added as metadata) on the image sharing site Flickr.
When a user has checked in to a location they can post notes, photos or
comments to other user’s notes for that place. Figure 5.13 shows a screenshot
of the Brightkite app from 2009.
LASNS privacy control analysis 97
Privacy control The only privacy control users of Brightkite have is to
block certain individuals from contacting them. You can choose to block
people from the Brightkite app, and organize blocked people through the
Brightkite web interface at http://brightkite.com/ depicted in Figure
5.14.
Figure 5.14: This figure shows a screenshot from the web-based Brightkite
control panel for administrating blocked individuals
5.5 LASNS privacy control analysis
Without the LA component of these services, they are basically only SNSs,
and these we have already had a privacy discussion of in Chapter 4. The
privacy control of non-LA elements in these LASNS systems such as sharing
photos, posting status updates, etc. should meet the general requirements
as stated in Section 4.3, ”Privacy requirements for SNSs in general”. This
is something all these services have to work with, as many of them lack it
completely. What is more important is what kind of user privacy control of
locational information these services have and might lack.
Protection of LA information When examining the LASNSs Facebook
Places, Foursquare, Gowalla, Loopt and Brightkite it becomes clear that the
users have little fine-grained control over who they share their location with
and when. If the user has any control, it is usually limited to choosing to
show your location to everyone or only friends. Only FBP provide any more
fine-grained tuning of which subjects are allowed to see your check-ins, as
they have the customization panel where you can specify individuals you
would like to share with or hide the location from. In light of the list of
privacy control requirements in Section 4.3, ”Privacy requirements for SNSs
in general”, the privacy control for these services seems insufficient at the
least. With the location being the object one wishes to control, none of them
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meet requirements 2 to 6 for this, except for FBP with the customization
option meeting the second requirement. As discussed previously, locational
data is by itself (and can hold) extremely personal information. That is
why the user should have at least as much control over how their location
is shared as any other piece of information in SNSs, such as Facebook. To
put it in perspective, Facebook offers their users more fine-grained privacy
control over who can see their stated general interests, than what Gowalla
offers for their users’ locational information.
Based on our general SNS privacy requirements (Section 4.3) and our
information sensitivity assessment of locational information, we have iden-
tified a few missing or inadequate privacy control elements for these kinds
of LASNSs: Users should be able to control when (under which conditions)
their locations (and other objects) are shared and to whom for different
features. The user should be able to make some general rules for their loca-
tional sharing based on the following five variables. These rules will control
how and when a user’s location is displayed by different features to different
individuals in the system. When users post their location these rules should
dictate how it is shared, possibly hiding it entirely if the user has decided to
display no check-ins after 10 pm and it is 10.15 pm. Even though this list
is based on our requirements for privacy control of locational data, this list
should also apply to all other types of objects.
Privacy control elements that are missing or inadequate in privacy
control panels in existent LASNSs:
1. Object type - The users should be able to control access to the objects
related to them, in this case, especially their current location or location
history.
2. Owner relation to subject - The choice between revealing your loca-
tion to ”Everyone” or ”Only Friends”, which is often the only choices
(if there are any), is very limited. Connections (”Friends”) imported
through Facebook and Twitter for instance, can represent less close per-
sonal relationships than close friendships. The user should be able to
make more fine-grained division between different types of connections
and grant different access right to such groups.
3. Location - The users should be able to make access control rules based
on their location or the access requesting subject’s location. Also, ev-
ery location should have a type such as ”Bar”,”Hotel”, ”Classroom”,
”Park”, etc., and the user should be able to set different access rights
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to different subjects based on the type of location one checks in to. A
user might want colleagues to only see when they check into restaurants
and sports arenas, but not personal homes or hotels.
4. Time - The user should be able to set a time constraint for each rule,
stating when it is applicable (working hours, evenings, holidays, etc).
In addition the user should be able to set a default expiration date on
its check-ins. This should also be specifiable for every check in.
5. Owner and subject attributes - The user should be able to filter the
subjects allowed to see their locations based on their own or the sub-
ject’s attributes, such as a certain age group, people with similar inter-
ests, people who work at the place your are at, etc.
One feature that exemplifies all these is FBPs ”Here Now” feature. Being
included in ”Here Now” after you check into a place can only be enabled
or disabled, yet should be more tunable to different subjects with different
attributes at different times and at different types of locations.
5.6 Conclusion
The location awareness of services, especially SNSs, demands adequate user
privacy control. Knowing one’s location not only tells you where they are,
but gives you hints and indications about his or her personal life. Some
people are very personal and protective of such information while others
like to share everything. These preference differences should be reflected in
users’ privacy settings, and the developers of LASNSs should thus enable
such control. These privacy control panels should give the users the chance,
for those who wish to, to express fine-grained privacy preferences, especially
when it comes to stating under which conditions and to whom their locations
(or other objects) are shared.
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Chapter 6
Enhanced Privacy Control
Framework for LASNSs
Through elaborate scenarios, examples and discussions we have showed that
users can have privacy preferences that current LASNS’s coarse-grained con-
trol panels are not able to reflect. The analysis of existent privacy control
features in LASNSs in Section 5.5, ”LASNS privacy control analysis”, has
identified five missing or inadequate elements in current LASNSs, based on
our requirements for end-user privacy access control (especially for locational
data). Simply put, we require LASNS privacy control panels to have the tools
for users to create access control rules based on the following variables:
1. Object type
2. Owner relation to subject
3. Location
4. Time
5. Owner and subject attributes
Many users must currently compromise their sense of privacy in order to
use these services. We will in this chapter propose a few access control
enhancements that are implementable in these LASNS systems, which in turn
will help the user fine-tune what they share and how. These enhancements
will make sure the resulting system fulfills all of the six proposed requirements
for SNSs from Section 4.3, ”Privacy requirements for SNSs in general” plus
all of the five proposed user control requirements for LASNS in Section 5.5,
”Protection of LA information” (listed above).
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6.1 Privacy-enhancing access control for LASNSs
The task of increasing user privacy control in LASNSs essentially means
making sure the users can input their privacy preferences in the system, and
have the system enforce them. Preferences can be expressed as privacy rules,
which can be written as access control rules, which can be translated into
some standard language and enforced in a system. Preferences can be based
on subject roles, attributes, time, location or other factors, and access control
rules should be able to contain these elements.
We propose two separate access control enhancements, which together
will add all of the five currently missing elements to LASNS, satisfying our
demand for end-user privacy control through access control rule specification.
Both these proposals will be presented in detail in the sections below.
• More fine-grained subject separation.
• Fine-grained rule conditions.
6.1.1 More fine-grained subject separation
When a user makes an access control rule, the rule will have to at least contain
the object in question (the location, an image or album, wall posts, etc.), the
kind of access they wish to control (read, write, etc.) plus the subject(s)
who are to receive such access to that object. For many of the services
we have presented in this thesis the choices for subjects have been centered
around ”friends” and everyone else, where ”friends” represent everyone you
have made a connection with through Facebook, Twitter, e-mail contacts and
other services. The main reason why we claim these services need more fine-
grained subject separation is that these connections, often called ”friends”
does not necessarily correspond to real-world friendships in the traditional
sense. A user’s ”friend”-base used in the LASNSs (often imported contacts
from existing SNSs) can consist of many different types of relationships to the
user such as; colleagues, family, classmates, acquaintances, fans, etc. People
use LASNSs for different purposes for different kinds of relations, making new
friends, maintaining close friendships, contacting colleagues, sharing content
with friends and similar. This means that one might want to share different
content with different types of ”friends” to reflect this differentiated use.
That is why the system should let the user be able to group these ”friends”
based on the user’s relationship with them and their role to the user, and set
different AC rules for different groups(roles).
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RBAC
Granting access to ”Friends”, ”Friends of friends” or ”People in your net-
work”, can be classified as role-based AC, RBAC, as the user will grant access
to a group of people based on their role or relationship with the user. Still,
as explained above, the role-options provided by current end-user privacy
control panels are too limited in light of our requirements. More fine-grained
subject separation can be accomplished through the introduction of a more
extensive version of Core RBAC (Section 2.1.4) in the system, with the user
as the system administrator. Specifically, implementing an end-user control
panel for user-role assignment, which further can be used when specifying
access control rules based on the specified roles. The user will thus be the
system administrator, administering roles and making AC rules based on
these roles. As each user is the system administrator for their objects (im-
ages, posts, friendships, profile information etc.) and subjects (friends), the
roles will be assigned according to the subjects role(relationship) to the user.
These roles/relationships will thus only be relevant when access to that user’s
resources is requested, and the user’s role-user assignment will be editable
and accessible only to that user.
The point of RBAC is, instead of evaluating and making access rules
for each individual subject, the subjects are divided into groups according
to their role in the system, and access control rights are assigned based on
different roles, not different subjects. This is efficient when the roles usually
correspond to the different usages of the system and its resources, such that
it is natural to assign AC rules to roles. As there are many more subjects
than roles, RBAC becomes more efficient, in both assigning and changing
access rights. In LASNSs the subject’s role or relationship to the user often
represents which access rights the user will want to grant the subject, and
using this RBAC model might prove much more efficient than specifying
individual ”friends” for each access rule. The problem with the current,
limited RBAC, with only a few system-defined roles, is that they provide
a too coarse-grained separation of a user’s connection. For RBAC to be
efficient, roles have to be specialized enough for users to be able to reflect
their privacy preferences through access control rules containing these roles.
RBAC is not efficient when a user with certain privacy preferences has to
list individuals for each access control rule to enforce them, because the
system-defined roles contain the wrong people. This is why these systems
should implement a control panel for role-assignment, and make these roles
available as the subject element of access control rules.
The user will create their own roles/relationships reflecting the differ-
ent relationships and thus usages with all their connections(friends). Every
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friend can be assigned to one or more roles/relationships. As examples of
this; a family member can also be a close friend, a classmate can end up as
a colleague too and a colleague might end up as a close friend or a even a
romantic partner. In these cases it is natural that the role/relationship with
the highest level of access right in each access case prevails. An example
of role assignment in a LASNS can be seen in Figure 6.1. When the user’s
Figure 6.1: This figure shows a high-level view of how role assignment of a
user’s friend could possibly look like.
friends are assigned their correct roles/relationships, these can be specified
(as choices in the drop-down menu) when creating access right rules in the
control panel. A high-level overview of how these roles/relationships can be
granted access to objects can be seen in Figure 6.2. Every connection(arrow)
between role and object is accompanied by access types and possibly con-
ditions under which the role’s access to the object should be granted. A
discussion of such conditions will be presented in Section 6.1.2, below. The
current subject drop-down choices for the services we have seen are choices
based on the notion of ”friends”, meaning all your connections or a list of
specific individuals for each rule. Including the roles/relationship names in
the drop-down menu will thus give the user more fine-grained control, plus
make this more efficient than having to list individuals for each rule.
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Figure 6.2: This figure shows a high-level view of how a user, after assigning
subjects to roles, can assign those roles access to relevant objects in the
system.
If a user A has no previous relationship with another user, user B, user
B’s role towards user A should be ”Stranger” by default. If they become
”friends”, or create another type of connection to each other, the assignment
of user B to the role ”Stranger” should be automatically removed from the
role list of A, and vice versa.
It is also important to note that it should be possible to also specify
individuals as well as roles/relationships for each access right rule, so that
introducing RBAC will not degrade user control compared to the current
options in FBP for instance. It would be impractical if the user has to create
a special role for one person, to be able to set access rights specifically for
that individual. This is why we have chosen to call the ”Subject” of the
access control rules in this chapter ”Subject/Role”.
6.1.2 Rule conditions
SNS systems can contain a lot of data per user. Age, profile photo, interests,
friendships, recommendations, romantic relationships, family relationships,
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posted photos, achievements, etc, and for LASNSs specifically, at times, the
user’s location. A system will also know about external factors, such as time.
Based on the scenarios in Chapter 3 plus our discussion and analysis of SNSs
and LASNSs, we have identified a need for users to be able to create con-
ditional access control rules in the privacy control panel of these services.
These kinds of rules will only be enforced after the user stated condition(s),
based on the value of the relevant attributes and logical operators, are eval-
uated to true. A user should be able to define multiple conditions, and pair
them with ”AND” and ”OR” operators. It is probably possible to use most
of the data these systems contain to make truly fine-grained privacy control
through the use of conditions. An example of how conditions can be paired
with roles/relationships(subjects), objects and access types to create a rule
representation of user preferences can be seen in Figure 6.3. As can be seen,
Figure 6.3: This figure shows a high-level view of a table of example rules
based on rule effect, roles/relationship, object, access type(s) and condi-
tion(s).
each access control rule will consist of relevant rule effect, ”Role/relationship”
(subject), object, access type plus zero or more conditions
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Condition format
To be able to translate user preferences into machine readable access control
rules, it is important that the user can input the conditions for their access
control rules in a standard format. A possible general format which can be
used in most cases is depicted in Figure 6.4. We believe that most conditions
consist of an attribute, an operator and a value. Together they create an
expression which can be evaluated at run-time, deciding whether to grant
the access defined in the access control rule the condition belongs to.
Figure 6.4: This figure shows a high-level view of how the conditions in
access control rules reflecting user preferences can be translated into a general
format, which in turn will be possible to translate into a standard machine-
readable format.
These conditions will be built using different attribute types. Following
is a list of possible system attributes. It will of course be up to system
developers to choose which attributes it is possible to use, yet the more
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choices the user has, the more fine-grained access control rules he/she can
make, the more privacy control the user will have.
• Owner attributes (own location, age, education etc.)
• Subject attributes (subject location, interests, profile, age, etc.)
• External attributes (time)
The system should provide the user with a drop-down menu of possible at-
tributes suitable for creating access control rule conditions. The operator
choices will depend on which attribute is chosen. If it is a numerical value,
the operators might be < or = for instance, while for locations the operators
might be ”is not”, ”is”, ”is nearby (within 1 mile, for instance)”, or similar.
The drop-down menu choices for the field ”value” will depend on both the
attribute and possibly the operator, depending on what the LASNS system
developers have chosen to make available.
6.2 Implementation
The idea of being able to input user preferences into these LASNS system is
a good one, yet there are two challenges that will arise when implementing
this kind of user control. First of all, the interface where the users will input
their rules has to be understandable and in a format that hopefully will
capture most preferences, yet be simple enough for the users to bother to
do it. Second of all, the rules defined by the user have to be translated into
code that the system can understand, and the rules have to be enforced in
the system.
6.2.1 User interface
The article ”Patient-Administered Access Control: a Usability Study”, [sA09],
by Lillian Røstad and Ole Andreas Alsos, sheds light on the importance of
a well-designed user interface. This article discusses patient administered
AC in a healthcare information system, where the patient is the system ad-
ministrator. This case is somewhat similar to our case, where we aim to
propose user administered AC in LASNSs. Information healthcare systems
contain more sensitive data and different types of data than can be found in
LASNSs. The research in [sA09] is therefore not exactly applicable to our
case, yet the focus on interface design can be applied in this master thesis.
Increased complexity of user privacy control can introduce weaker security,
Implementation 109
as users usually are not security or privacy experts. In order to achieve bet-
ter privacy, through more complex privacy control features, the users have to
understand how to control it according to their preferences. This is why an
understandable GUI has to be part of a well-designed user privacy control
model, and attention should be brought to usability, as well as the underlying
technology.
Different users have different privacy preferences. Some users might feel
that current LASNS privacy control panels are adequate, and others might
not even care much about privacy. Still, some people, the author included,
have preferences which can not be reflected in the current control panels. The
two enhancement techniques described above, RBAC and rule conditions,
help users who wish to specify more fine-grained access control rules for
their objects. Dealing with different user privacy control requirements calls
for a privacy control GUI that is 1) simple and general enough to use for
those who are satisfied with current privacy control, yet 2) customizable
enough for users with special privacy preferences, such that they are able
to create fine-grained access control rules. The goal when implementing the
GUI for access control rule specification in the end-user privacy control panel
should thus be to make it efficient, yet simple to use. This balance can be
accomplished by continuing to offer the more general current privacy panels
(as in Facebook), which are easily adjustable for general rules and easy to
understand, yet adding a GUI part where users can input more specialized
rules. The privacy control panel will thus consist of two parts:
• General privacy control.
• Special cases/preferences: Writing specific rules with object, subject,
access type and condition.
Where a specialized rule conflicts with the general privacy settings an object
is affected by, it might be fair to assume that the specialized rule for that
object is more important (as the user has taken the time to specify it), and
that the specialized rule should prevail and thus be enforced. An example of
how a privacy control panel GUI can be shaped is depicted in Figure 6.5:
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Users should be able to input multiple specialized AC rules to reflect their
privacy preferences. Each specific rule consists of a rule effect (”Allow” or
”Deny”), one Object, one or more Subjects (role/relationship or individuals),
one or more access types plus zero or more conditions. When one subject,
access type or condition is chosen, a new option panel will show up so that
the user can specify more items (several access types, for instance).
Following is a description of the steps a user will take to create an ac-
cess control rule through the privacy control panel depicted in Figure 6.5.
Through these steps, the user will create an access control rule in a general
and controlled format, which will be translatable into more formalized access
control rule formats (XACML for instance) and later enforced in a system’s
access control component(s).
Effect First of all, the user will choose whether this rule will either ”Allow”
or ”Deny” the specified subject(s) the type(s) of access to the object under
the chosen conditions.
Object Secondly, the user will choose which object the rule will be relevant
for, through a drop-down menu of all objects related to the user which he/or
she is allowed to make access rules for. The reason why only one object can
be chosen for each rule is that the drop-down menu choices for access types
will depend on which object the user has chosen. One example of this is that
it might not be appropriate to grant other users write access to your own
profile picture, thus the access type ”write” should not appear when writing
an access rule for the user’s profile photo. If multiple objects were possible,
conflicts and confusion could arise from the access type choices.
Subject(s)/Role(s) Third, the user will choose which subject(s) will re-
ceive the right to access the object. The subject drop-down choices will con-
sist of all the user-defined roles/relationships, more general groupings like
”friends”, ”everyone”, ”my network”, and similar, plus the option to specify
individual users.
Access type(s) The fourth step is for the users to specify which access
type(s) they would like to grant the subject(s) to the object.
Logic operator (optional) The fifth step depends on whether the user
wishes to create conditions or not. If that is the case, the user is required
to choose how the condition shall affect the rest of the rule. Whether access
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should be granted ”Only if”, ”If”, ”Except when” (or similar logic operators)
the condition(s) are evaluated to true.
Condition(s) (optional) Last, the user can choose to create zero or more
conditions under which the subject(s) will get the specific access type(s) to
the object. The conditions are created in a separate panel with two drop-
down menus and a value specification field, Attribute, Operator and Value,
respectively. The drop-down menu choices for operator and the value field
restrictions will depend on which attribute is chosen. The possible attribute
value types for the chosen attribute, numbers, time, text, roles/relationship,
location etc. will limit which operators are possible on that attribute, and
naturally, which values the user is allowed to type in. If the user chooses to
create multiple conditions, he or she has to put them together with operators
such as ”AND” and ”OR”. This kind of logic might be a little bit confusing
to some users, and therefore it might be best to limit the ability to combine
conditions to maximum two conditions, combined with either ”AND” or
”OR”.
From input to textual representation
The order in which the different rule elements appear in the enhanced privacy
control panel is based on which dependencies exist between them. That is
why the order is: Rule effect, Object, Subject(s), Access type(s), and for con-
ditions specification; Logic operator, Attribute, Operator and Value, where
the choice between the logic operators ”AND” and ”OR” will appear after at
least one condition is created. When a user has created an AC rule through
this panel, it might be valuable for the user to be able to read the access
control rule in a format closer to natural language, e.g English. Because
the rule components are specified in a standard way, it will be possible to
translate it into such a format. One can thus include a button or a display
panel revealing the specified rule in a more understandable format for user
inspection. With the rule elements specified through the panel, a sentence
describing the rule will look similar to this:
”<Subject(s)> is/are <Rule effect> to/from <Access type(s)>
<Object> <Logic operator> <Attribute> <Operator> <Value>”
One example is:
Colleagues (role) are allowed to (rule effect) read (access type)
my Profile information (object) only if (logic operator) their age
(attribute) < (operator) 30 (value).
There is a need for some formatting of the words to create the right sen-
tences, such a translating ”Allow” to ”allowed to”, ”Deny” to ”denied from”,
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use singular and plural form depending on the subject/role, bind multiple
access types and subjects with ”and” and maybe modifying attribute values
such as ”Subject Network” to ”Their Network” depending on the variables.
This can be done through programming, as the developers decide the drop-
down menu choices for these elements, and thus can tailor translation algo-
rithms to display the sentence in correct natural language. An example of
such a translation, from data sent to the system through the proposed GUI
to an understandable sentence, is illustrated in Figure 6.6:
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6.2.2 From user scenario case to system-interpretable
access control rule
When the users have reflected their privacy preferences through privacy con-
trol panels, the system has to receive it, interpret it and enforce it. A rule-
structure understandable by users is not necessarily the best representation
for a computer system. That is why the data received from the GUI has
to be properly prepared before used in the system’s access control decision
and enforcement components. We are going to use a few of the user pri-
vacy preferences from Chapter 3, ”Scenarios”, listed below, to explain how
such preferences can be translated into a more machine-readable format. We
will translate the preferences into a high-level AC rule format, and further
translate these into more formalized languages like Datalog and XACML, as
explained below.
Each of the five preferences represents one of the five currently missing or
inadequate privacy control elements stated in Section 5.5, ”Protection of LA
information” and in the introduction of this chapter. The reason for this is to
show that our proposed access control rule format containing these elements
are both understandable as a GUI (as discussed above), and translatable
into a more formal machine-readable format. This will again show that our
proposed AC rule enhancements will not only fulfill our requirements from a
user perspective, but are implementable in a system.
1. Object type - Scenario 1, preference 16 - ”As a regular user, I wish
to hide my photos from strangers.”
2. User relation to subject - Scenario 1, preference 11 - ”As a 25 year
old guy, I want to show the photo album from the guy-trip to London
only to my close friends, except the close friends who are also in my
family.”
3. Location - Scenario 2, preference 5 - ”As a Facebook Places user, I
would like for my colleagues to be able to chat with me only when I
am at work, at Bank of America.”
4. Time - Scenario 1, preference 13 - ”As a business woman, I only want
my colleagues and acquaintances to see the places I have checked in to
during business hours.”
5. Owner and subject attributes - Scenario 1, preference 2 - ”As a
student, I want only the people in the same network as me to be able
to find me in searches.”
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The first step is to extract the relevant data components from the textual
preferences. Through the proposed user interface, or similar, the system will
receive rules consisting of:
• The rule effect.
• The object in question.
• Roles/relationship or users (Subjects).
• The access type(s)
• Logic operator (optional)
• Condition(s) (optional), each consisting of the following components:
– Attribute
– Operator
– Value
In the case of the chosen preferences the system will receive the following
data:
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The rules in the table in Figure 6.7 can be presented as structured natural
language, as defined below. This language and structure is inspired by the
syntax in [Wikg], and brings us closer to a machine-readable format:
1.
Deny ac c e s s to r e s ou r c e Photos with a t t r i b u t e OwnerID=”
y”
i f SubjectRo le s conta in ” Stranger ”
and ac t i on i s read
2.
Allow acc e s s to r e s ou r c e PhotoAlbum with a t t r i b u t e
AlbumID=”x” and OwnerID=”y”
i f SubjectRo le s conta in ”Close f r i e n d ”
and i f SubjectRo les do not conta in ”Family”
and ac t i on i s read
3.
Allow acc e s s to r e s ou r c e Chat with a t t r i b u t e OwnerID=”x
”
i f SubjectRo le s do conta in ”Col l eague ”
and i f OwnerLocation=”Bank o f America”
and ac t i on i s read or wr i t e
4.
Allow acc e s s to r e s ou r c e Locat ions with a t t r i b u t e
OwnerID=”x”
i f SubjectRo le s do conta in ”Col l eague ” or ”
Acquaintances ”
and i f Time > 08 .00
and i f Time < 16 .00
and ac t i on i s read
5.
Allow acc e s s to r e s ou r c e SearchRecord with a t t r i b u t e
OwnerID=”x”
i f SubjectNetwork = OwnerNetwork
and ac t i on i s read
Further these structured natural language rules can be translated into the
language called Datalog, referenced in [BCFP03], and explained in [Cer90].
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Datalog can be directly embedded into SQL-based DBMS, including Cassan-
dra (used by Facebook).
1.
r u l e : : i f
Att r ibute ResourceType=PhotoAlbum
and
Att r ibute OwnerID=x
and
SubjectRo les i s a Stranger
and
Action=read
then
may−not−ac c e s s
2.
r u l e : : i f
Att r ibute ResourceType=PhotoAlbum
and
Att r ibute AlbumID=x
and
Att r ibute OwnerID=y
and
SubjectRo les i s a Close Friend
and
SubjectRo les i s not Family
and
Action=read
then
may−ac c e s s
3.
r u l e : : i f
Att r ibute ResourceType=Chat
and
Att r ibute OwnerID=x
and
SubjectRo les i s a Col l eague
and
OwnerLocation=”Bank o f America”
and
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Action=read or Action=wr i t e
then
may−ac c e s s
4.
r u l e : : i f
Att r ibute ResourceType=Locat ions
and
Att r ibute OwnerID=x
and
SubjectRo les i s a Col l eague or Acquaintance
and
Time > 08 .00
and
Time < 16 .00
and
Action=read
then
may−ac c e s s
5.
r u l e : : i f
Att r ibute ResourceType=SearchRecord
and
Att r ibute OwnerID=x
and
SubjectNetwork=OwnerNetwork
and
Action=read
then
may−ac c e s s
These Datalog rules and their components can be translated into XACML
rules. With XACML the rules are represented in a standard way, and one
can reap the benefits from the standardization work done with the language.
Benefits include using a standardized representation of rules instead of creat-
ing one themselves, being able to export privacy preferences to other systems,
plus using the XACML enforcement architecture explained in Section 2.2.5.
XACML is an elaborate language with much syntax and many words to
describe each rule. It can thus be challenging to understand the rules at
first glance, because of the heavy syntax. Therefore, while we have trans-
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lated all the five rules into XACML syntax, only one of them is included and
thoroughly explained in this chapter as an example. A complete XACML
representation of all the rules can be found in Appendix A: ”XACML exam-
ples”. The chosen rule will be presented in a simplified format for the sake
of the explanation. To best present the rule elements through all the syn-
tax, we will not include the complete paths of all the DataTypes, MatchIds,
FunctionIDs, AttributeIDs and similar. One example of this is; instead
of writing ’DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string”’ we
will just write ’DataType=”string”’. We have chosen to use rule number
4, based on the user preference ”As a business woman, I only want my
colleagues and acquaintances to see the places I have checked in to during
business hours”. This rule contains both of the enhancements we have pro-
posed in this chapter, user-administered role-based access control and rule
conditions, in this case based on the external attribute ”Time”.
The blue text are comments describing which resource/subject/condition
variables the code below reflects. The red text highlights the most important
elements of the different rule-components.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
ResourceType=Locations
<ResourceMatch MatchId=”..:string-equal”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
Locations
</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” s t r i n g ”
Att r ibute Id=”..:resource-type”/>
</ResourceMatch>
OwnerID=x
<ResourceMatch MatchId=”..:string-equal”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
x
</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” s t r i n g ”
Att r ibute Id=”..:resource:owner-id”/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
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<Action ” read ”>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
<Apply FunctionId=”and”>
SubjectRole=Colleague
<Apply FunctionId=”..:string-at-least-one-member-of”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” s t r i n g ”
Att r ibute Id=”..:subject:roles”/>
<Apply FunctionId=” . . : s t r i n g−bag”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
Colleague
</Attr ibuteValue>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
Acquaintance
</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
Time > 08:00
<Apply FunctionId=”..:time-greater-than-or-equal”
<Apply FunctionId=” . . : t ime−one−and−only ”>
<Envi ronmentAttr ibuteSe lector DataType=”time”
Att r ibute Id=”..:environment:current-time”/>
</Apply>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=”time”>
08:00:00
</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
Time < 16:00
<Apply FunctionId=”..:time-less-than-or-equal”
<Apply FunctionId=” . . : t ime−one−and−only ”>
<Envi ronmentAttr ibuteSe lector DataType=”time”
Att r ibute Id=”..:environment:current-time”/>
</Apply>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=”time”>
16:00:00
</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condit ion>
</Rule>
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Through this translation exercise we have shown that the enhancements
we propose will not only cover the relevant requirements and make sense
from a user perspective, but also they are representable in languages which
have an existing enforcement architecture, like Datalog and XACML. The
developers of existent and future LASNS systems wishing to implement the
privacy control enhancements suggested in this thesis using the XACML
framework will thus have to do the following:
• Create a role/relationship representation for connections (”friendships”)
in the social graph.
• Create a GUI for role/relationship management.
• Change/add to the back-bone such that it handles subjects, objects,
attributes, access types and corresponding operators and values as rule
elements.
• Create the user GUI, where drop-down menus and field restrictions
reflect the possible rule elements, for the users to create enhances access
control rules.
• Program the translation of the input from the GUI into the XACML
format.
• Implement the necessary XACML rule enforcement architecture.
6.3 Comparison with existent solutions
In previous chapters we have identified privacy control requirements, based
on various possible user preferences, which are missing or inadequate in cur-
rent systems. What was lacking was a good way for users to control access to
their objects based on the following variables; object types, owner relation to
subject, location, time, plus owner and subject attributes. One of our goals
have been to present user privacy control enhancements that will, when im-
plemented in LASNS systems, fulfill these requirements. The enhancements
we have proposed in this chapter; more fine-grained subject separation and
the addition of fine-grained rule conditions, thus represents an improvement
to existent solutions because it allows the users to make their own access
control rules based on the variables just mentioned. This has been shown
through five example preferences, one for each of the five variables, translated
into a formal representation usable in a system. All of these five preferences
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could not have been reflected in a system where our two proposed enhance-
ments were not implemented, thus we can say that they are both essential
for fulfilling our stated LASNS privacy control requirements.
Another important goal has been to make the enhancements effective and
understandable from a user perspective, plus implementable in LASNSs from
a developer perspective.
User-perspective We have proposed a possible GUI for an enhanced end-
user privacy control panel, the goal being that both general privacy con-
trol, through current coarse-grained panels should be possible, yet more fine-
grained access control rules should be specifiable. Different users have differ-
ent preferences, and the goal has been to present a solution that will work
for all kinds of user, with all kinds of different (realistic) preferences. In the
proposed GUI we have therefore retained the more general privacy control,
as in Facebook’s privacy control panel, where users can specify high-level
rules. This will create an easy way for people to create the more general
rules based on preferences which current panels can reflect, plus satisfy the
needs of people who do not want to or who are not confident creating new
and possibly more demanding fine-grained rules. Yet, our proposed GUI
will provide those who do wish to specify more fine-grained access control
rules the option to do so. We created the GUI for these specialized rules
with the focus on being both effective and understandable, creating a panel
where drop-down menus allows users with no experience with AC rule logic
to create such rules.
Developer perspective To show that our enhancements are implementable
from a developer perspective, we have shown how the five preferences, pro-
vided to the system through the proposed GUI, can be translated into logic
rules and to more machine readable formats (XACML or Datalog). This
ties our proposed enhancements, developed from a user perspective, to rep-
resentations in known and researched formats. There are multiple benefits
to doing this; It might be possible to reuse the user preferences expressed in
a platform-independent language to exchange or use/reuse privacy policies
in other systems. If a user has a privacy policy profile in one LASNS, with a
defined set of rules, these could possibly be transferred and reused in other
systems where the same user has an account. Another benefit of translating
these preferences into any formal logical representation is that it allows us to
do security analysis of such rules. One example of this is to be able to check
consistency and safety through formal analysis. Both Datalog and XACML
contain a framework for making such analysis.
Chapter 7
Future work
The next natural step is to try out these enhancement ideas by mapping
XACML into an example system with a fair amount of data, and develop the
backbone and GUI such that the suggestions in Chapter 6 can be evaluated
in practice.
The enhancements suggested in this thesis relies on the user to exploit the
possibilities, making their own access control rules. Many users do not care
about their privacy, and/or do not understand the consequences of sharing
too much information. It is also possible that users have privacy preferences
that conflicts with their LASNS account privacy control settings, because
they are not aware of this or they do not know how to reflect them through
these panels. Useful work can thus be directed to helping the users obtain
a healthy amount of privacy awareness, and further have them understand
how they can reflect their preferences through privacy control panels.
Through the usage of LASNSs, we can try to improve user privacy con-
trol panels, yet how can we trust the people behind these services not to
abuse our personal information? They are the ones responsible for enforcing
the access control, and the only way to protect your information from such
abuse is to make sure only the information you wish to share with the system
leaves your computer, phone or other device. To tighten privacy control even
more, one can research ways to ”move” the policy decision and enforcement
points to the client side, where the clients can control exactly what informa-
tion leaves their device. This point is even more important when it comes
to apps developed by people who you have no reason to trust (third-party
developers of iOS, Android, Facebook, Twitter -based apps and programs for
instance). These people can, through open APIs develop popular apps with
little resources, lowering the threshold for who are able to reach the users.
It would be much more safe to use these kinds of LASNSs if the user could
control which information leaves their device from the client side. Other
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important work in relation to this problem is to get the providers of popu-
lar open APIs to create stricter rules as to how the developers using their
framework handles user information.
The LASNSs used today are mostly made for fun and social interactions.
Still, SNSs have made their way into corporate environments with systems
such as Socialcast, and so could LASNSs. Creating a corporate environment
SNS or LASNS is different than making a system open to whoever signs up
and where each user is able to decide whether their information is public
or not. A corporate setting is different as it is possible to control who the
system is open to, because it is possible to limit who gets an account to
only include employees or other people with some sort of connection to the
company in a practical way. Another difference is that corporate settings
often demand more privacy control and can also demand more centralized
confidentiality control. There is a much bigger need for information flow
control to protect sensitive business information. Future research can go
into how access control can be used in such a LASNS setting, possibly using
the proposed access control enhancement; RBAC, with a combination of the
user as the system administrator to non-sensitive information objects, and
a central system administrator to control access to sensitive information. In
such a setting it might make sense to use more elements from the RBAC
framework, introducing Hierarchical RBAC for instance.
In addition to this possible future work, topics related to this thesis
are proposed as student project ideas for master students at the Institute
of Telematics at NTNU, and a conference article extending this work is
planned.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In the introduction six research questions were defined.
”1. What kind of access control features exist in current LASNS
to control end-user’s privacy?”
We have discovered, through analysis and discussion, that in our opinion,
the users of existing LASNSs have very limited and inadequate tools for
protecting how their data is shared and treated.
”2. What kind of privacy preferences may end-users have in
LASNSs?”
Through imagined scenarios and experience in social networks, we have es-
tablished that users may have many different fine-grained privacy preferences.
Users wish to control who can access which data (related to them), in what
way, and under which conditions. As LASNS contain sensitive personal data,
users should demand such fine-grained access control.
”3. Are existent access control features in LASNSs able to satisfy
end-user’s privacy requirements/preferences?”
Based on the different privacy preferences users might have, we created a
set of end-user privacy control requirements. None of the examined LASNS
control panels fulfilled all the requirements, some not fulfilling a single one.
”4. Which privacy-enhancing access control features in LASNSs
should be added (or improved in which way) to satisfy end-user’s
requirements/preferences? (Illustrated with examples.)”
Based on our established end-user privacy requirements, we have identified
the need for two proposed enhancements. First, the need for more fine-
grained subject separation. The ability to divide the potential subjects into
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groups, based on their relationship/role towards the user, and make access
control rules based on these roles/relationships. Second of all, make sure
users can specify fine-grained conditions to these rules, reflecting under which
conditions a rule should be applied. Together these two enhancements help
fulfill all the identified requirements.
”5. How can the privacy-enhancing access control features be
represented to end-users?”
Different users have different privacy preferences. A GUI for end-user privacy
control should be both effective in reflecting different user’s different privacy
preferences, yet as understandable and user-friendly as possible. We have
therefore proposed an interface with both a more general way of represent-
ing access control rules (similar to Facebook’s current privacy control panel),
with system-specified object types and access types, and a user-specifiable
subject, yet with an option for specifying tailored access control rules with the
combination of rule effect, object types, subject/roles, access types, and con-
ditions through easily understandable drop-down menus and variable speci-
fication.
”6. How can the privacy-enhancing access control features be
represented in terms of logic rules and in machine readable format
(e.g. XACML)?”
With our proposed enhanced GUI the system will receive a defined set of
data. We have shown that data from the GUI input of five example user
preferences, one representing each of our end-user privacy requirements, can
be translated into both Datalog and XACML logic rules. This shows that
our two enhancements, developed from an end-user perspective are also im-
plementable from a developer perspective, and could be further analyzed and
extended through the use of formal languages.
LASNSs will usually demand a balance between trust and access control.
Sometimes, in order for the service to be of value to the user, one might have
to make sacrifices when it comes to privacy. Still, users should demand better
privacy control than what is offered in existing LASNSs. Locational infor-
mation, paired with information from SNSs, can represent sensitive personal
information, and the user should be able to choose to whom, how and when
it is shared. Our two proposed enhancements fulfills this requirement, and it
is shown that they work from both a GUI and implementation point of view.
The next step would be to examine the consistency of the logic rules from
a security point of view, and naturally, to implement these enhancements to
test them in practice.
Appendix A
XACML examples
This Appendix consists of a more complete translation from the following
list of user preferences discussed in Chapter 6 into XACML rules.
1. ”As a regular user, I wish to hide my photos from strangers.”
2. ”As a 25 year old guy, I want to show the photo album from the guy-
trip to London only to my close friends, except the close friends who
are also in my family.”
3. ”As a Facebook Places user, I would like for my colleagues to be able
to chat with me only when I am at work, at Bank of America.”
4. ”As a business woman, I only want my colleagues and acquaintances
to see the places I have checked in to during business hours.”
5. ”As a student, I want only the people in the same network as me to be
able to find me in searches.”
1.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Deny”>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
< !−− ResourceType=PhotoAlbum −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>PhotoAlbum</Attr ibuteValue>
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<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : v a r i a t i o n s 2 : r e s o u r c e−type ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−− OwnerID=x −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>x</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
urn :xacml :2 . 0 : i n t e r op : examp l e : r e s ou r c e : owne r−id ”
/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
<Action ” read ”>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
< !−− Sub jec tRo le=Stranger −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−at−l e a s t−one−member−o f ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 .
org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s u b j e c t : r o l e s ”/>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−bag”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Stranger</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condit ion>
</Rule>
2.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
< !−− ResourceType=PhotoAlbum −−>
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<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>PhotoAlbum</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : v a r i a t i o n s 2 : r e s o u r c e−type ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−− AlbumID=x −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>x</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: r e source :a lbum−id ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−− OwnerID=y −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>y</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
urn :xacml :2 . 0 : i n t e r op : examp l e : r e s ou r c e : owne r−id ”
/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
<Action ” read ”>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : and ”>
< !−− Sub jec tRo le=Close f r i e nd −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−at−l e a s t−one−member−o f ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3
. org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s u b j e c t : r o l e s ”/>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−bag”>
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<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Close f r i e n d</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
< !−− Sub jec tRo le != Family −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : n o t ”>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−at−l e a s t−one−member−o f ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s u b j e c t : r o l e s ”/>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−bag”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Stranger</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condit ion>
</Rule>
3.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
< !−− ResourceType=Chat −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Chat</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : v a r i a t i o n s 2 : r e s o u r c e−type ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−− OwnerID=x −−>
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<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>x</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
urn :xacml :2 . 0 : i n t e r op : examp l e : r e s ou r c e : owne r−id ”
/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
<Actions>
<Action ” read ”>
<Action ”wr i t e ”>
</Act ions>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : and ”>
< !−− Sub jec tRo le=Col l eague −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−at−l e a s t−one−member−o f ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3
. org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s u b j e c t : r o l e s ”/>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−bag”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Stranger</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
< !−− OwnerLocation=Bank o f America −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Bank o f America</
Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: r e s o u r c e : own e r : l o c a t i o n ” />
</Apply>
</Apply>
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</Condit ion>
</Rule>
4.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Target>
<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
< !−−ResourceType=Locat ions−−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Locat ions</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : v a r i a t i o n s 2 : r e s o u r c e−type ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−−OwnerID=x}−−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>x</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
urn :xacml :2 . 0 : i n t e r op : examp l e : r e s ou r c e : owne r−id ”
/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
<Action ” read ”>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : and ”>
< !−−Sub jec tRo le=Col l eague−−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−at−l e a s t−one−member−o f ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3
. org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s u b j e c t : r o l e s ”/>
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<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−bag”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Col league</Attr ibuteValue>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>Acquaintance</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
< !−−Time > 08 :00−−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : t ime−greate r−than−or−equal ”
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : t ime−one−and−only ”>
<Envi ronmentAttr ibuteSe lector DataType=” ht tp : //www
.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#time” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: env i ronment : cur rent−time”/>
</Apply>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#time”>08 : 0 0 : 0 0</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
< !−−Time < 16 :00−−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : t ime−l e s s−than−or−equal ”
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f un c t i on : t ime−one−and−only ”>
<Envi ronmentAttr ibuteSe lector DataType=” ht tp : //www
.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#time” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: env i ronment : cur rent−time”/>
</Apply>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#time”>16 :00 :00</Attr ibuteValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condit ion>
</Rule>
5.
<Rule E f f e c t=”Permit”>
<Target>
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<Sub jec t s>
<AnySubject/>
</ Sub jec t s>
<Resource>
< !−− ResourceType=SearchRecord −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>SearchRecord</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
u rn : v a r i a t i o n s 2 : r e s o u r c e−type ”/>
</ResourceMatch>
< !−− OwnerID=x −−>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Attr ibuteValue DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/
XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>x</Attr ibuteValue>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=”
urn :xacml :2 . 0 : i n t e r op : examp l e : r e s ou r c e : owne r−id ”
/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
<Action ” read ”>
</Target>
<Condit ion>
< !−− SubjectNetwork=OwnerNetwork −−>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−equal ”>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−one−and−only ”>
<Sub jec tAtt r ibuteDes i gnato r DataType=” ht tp : //www.w3
. org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
: s ub j e c t : n e two rk ”/>
</Apply>
<Apply FunctionId=” u rn : o a s i s : n ame s : t c : x a cm l : 1 . 0
: f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g−one−and−only ”>
<ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator DataType=” ht tp : //www.
w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ” Att r ibute Id=” . . .
r e source :owner :ne twork ”/>
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</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condit ion>
</Rule>
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